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OUR INNER DEMONS: PROSECUTING 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Abstract: The United States does not currently have a uniform framework for 
how it handles domestic terrorism. Although there is a terrorism section of the 
criminal code that criminalizes certain actions that are deemed terroristic, these 
laws are applied disproportionately to those with an Islamic ideology. Political 
motivations and protectionist interests within the United States tend to prevent 
similar crimes committed in the name of, for example, right-wing terrorism to be 
convicted under the terrorism section of the criminal code. In light of the threat 
posed by domestic terrorism and other trends in the political and cultural ethos, 
the current state of the law is inadequate to address the problem and unjustly 
places a stigma on one subsection of the population. In the interest of equality 
under the eyes of the law, our judicial system should incorporate a uniform do-
mestic terrorism statute that is applied based on the actions of an individual, not 
based on their belief systems or individual backgrounds. 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2018, Robert D. Bowers entered a Pittsburgh synagogue, the 
Tree of Life Congregation, with an AR-15 assault rifle.1 Before surrendering to 
police, he killed eleven people in what has been described as one of the worst 
attacks on the Jewish community in this country’s history.2 Following his at-
tack in Pittsburgh, Bowers said he wanted all Jewish people to die for the sup-
posed wrongs they had done.3 When asked whether or not the attack would be 
classified as domestic terrorism, U.S. Attorney Scott Brady was noncommittal, 
stating there would have to be proof that Bowers was trying to promote a spe-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Christopher Mele et al., 11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; Suspect Charged with 29 Counts, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/active-shooter-pittsburgh-
synagogue-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/W73H-6FQ4]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Nicole Chavez et al., Pittsburgh Synagogue Gunman Said He Wanted All Jews to Die, Criminal 
Complaint Says, CNN (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/28/us/pittsburgh-synagogue-
shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/JYH5-NDES] (quoting Bowers as stating to a SWAT officer 
that he wanted “all Jews to die”). During the shootout, he told police officers, “I just want to kill 
Jews” because they were “committing genocide against my people.” Id. Prior to the incident he es-
poused hate speech online, referring to immigrants as “invaders” and sharing posts that referred to 
Jews as the “enemy of white people.” Julie Turkewitz & Kevin Rose, Who Is Robert Bowers, the 
Suspect in the Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/10/27/us/robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooter.html [https://perma.cc/9HAM-ZYN5] 
(describing the beliefs espoused by Robert Bowers). Just before the attack, he posted, “I can’t sit by 
and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.” Id.  
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cific ideology with his attack.4 In the same month, Cesar Sayoc mailed bombs 
to the homes of prominent political leaders including former presidents Barack 
Obama and Bill Clinton.5 Sayoc, a supporter of President Donald Trump, sent 
the bombs to political adversaries of the president.6 Attorney General Jeff Ses-
sions called the attempted bombings “political violence,” but Sayoc was not 
charged with domestic terrorism.7 
Throughout the course of the Trump presidency, ideologically motivated 
attacks have continued to plague the country.8 In August 2019, Patrick Crusius 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Chavez, supra note 3 (quoting Scott Brady) (“We continue to see where the line is. But for now, 
at this point in our investigation, we’re treating it as a hate crime.”). 
 5 Devlin Barrett et al., Man in Florida Arrested, Charged in Connection with Mail Bombs Sent to 
Public Figures, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/10/26/
suspected-explosive-devices-addressed-cory-booker-james-clapper-probe-expands-packages [https://
perma.cc/XTF3-7YHX]. 
 6 Scott Calvert et al., Suspect in Letter Bombs: A History of Arrests and a Prior Bomb Threat, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/suspect-in-letter-bombs-a-history-of-
arrests-and-a-prior-bomb-threat-1540572060 [https://perma.cc/5P5J-KLTC] (describing the politics of 
Cesar Sayoc and his affinity for President Trump). 
 7 Kathy Gilsinan, Why the Mail Bomber Wasn’t Charged with Terrorism, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 
26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/mail-bomb-terrorism-cesar-
sayoc/574144/ [https://perma.cc/W6CP-XSSN] (stating that Sayoc was not charged with terrorism 
because there is no federal crime for domestic terrorism and the most frequently used terrorism charge 
requires a connection to a foreign terrorism organization). Sayoc pled guilty to sixty-five felonies, 
sixteen of which were related to the use of a weapon of mass destruction, which is in the terrorism 
chapter of the criminal code. Cesar Sayoc Pleads Guilty to 65 Felonies for Mailing 16 Improvised 
Explosive Devices in Connection with October 2018 Domestic Terrorist Attack, DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 21, 
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cesar-sayoc-pleads-guilty-65-felonies-mailing-16-improvised-
explosive-devices-connection [https://perma.cc/2YLP-GHL9]. 
 8 Jim Carlton, El Paso Shooting Suspect Targeted Mexicans, Officials Say, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/el-paso-shooting-suspect-targeted-mexicans-officials-say-115653
83286 [https://perma.cc/7573-NCM5] (describing the 2019 El Paso attack and racist manifesto). The 
attack in El Paso was not the only mass shooting around that time. See Valerie Bauerlein et al., Mass 
Shootings in El Paso, Dayton Leave 31 Dead, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/mass-shootings-in-el-paso-dayton-leave-29-dead-11564962534 [https://perma.cc/6SES-UYE5] 
(describing shootings in El Paso, Dayton, and Gilroy). The day after the shooting in El Paso, Connor 
Betts murdered nine people and injured twenty-seven others in Dayton, Ohio. Kris Maher & Melanie 
Grayce West, Dayton Police Search for Motive in Mass Shooting, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/dayton-police-search-for-motive-in-mass-shooting-11565025704 [https://
perma.cc/6KHG-KX8R] (describing the attack). A week prior, Santino Legan killed three people and 
wounded thirteen others with an “AK-47 style assault rifle” in Gilroy, California. Evan Sernoffsky, 
Gilroy Garlic Festival Shooting: Killer Had More Guns, Survival Gear and a Clown Mask, S.F. 
CHRON. (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Gilroy-Garlic-Festival-shooting-
Killer-had-more-14291480.php [https://perma.cc/JK58-8YZ3]. Motives for those attacks are not as 
clear as the El Paso attack. See Jennifer Calfas, FBI Probes Shooters’ Motives Amid Wider Alarm 
Over Attacks, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-probes-two-shooters-
motives-amid-wider-alarm-over-attacks-11565136664 [https://perma.cc/N7YM-TZK3] (describing 
the search for motives in Gilroy and Dayton). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched a 
domestic terrorism investigation into the Gilroy shooting, exploring “violent ideologies” and a list 
Legan made “of religious and political targets on both sides of the aisle.” Zusha Ellison, Gilroy Shoot-
ing Prompts Domestic Terrorism Investigation by FBI, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/gilroy-shooting-prompts-domestic-terrorism-investigation-by-fbi-11565120296 
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walked into a Walmart with an AK-47 and murdered twenty-two people.9 Prior 
to the attack he published a manifesto online that said he wanted to target His-
panics because they posed a threat to the United States.10 Following the attack, 
U.S. Attorney John Bash told reporters, “swift and certain justice” will be de-
livered, because that is “what we do to terrorists in this country.”11 These at-
tacks have had a profound effect on the nation’s psyche and have forced the 
government to pay attention to the threat posed by domestic terrorism.12 
Despite the increased concern, it will be difficult to prosecute these acts 
as domestic terrorism because there is no such criminal statute in the United 
States.13 The threat of domestic terrorism emerged as a national concern fol-
lowing the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Okla-
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/J3N7-5M5C] (describing the investigation into a possible motive). The FBI is also 
exploring possible violent ideologies that inspired the shooting in Dayton. See Calfas, supra (describ-
ing the investigation and Betts’s left-leaning political views).  
 9 Carlton, supra note 8 (describing the attack and racist manifesto). 
 10 Id. (referencing Crusius’s Manifesto, which declared that Hispanics were “an ethnic and cultur-
al threat to the U.S. and were taking jobs from native-born Americans”). Most of his victims were 
Hispanic and seven were Mexican citizens. Id. 
 11 Matt Ford, The Danger of a Domestic Terrorism Law, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 2009), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/154785/danger-domestic-terrorism-law [https://perma.cc/W6UC-L9JX]. 
 12 See Caitlin Dickerson et al., ‘It Feels Like Being Hunted’: Latinos Across U.S. in Fear After El 
Paso Massacre, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/el-paso-shooting-
latino-anxiety.html [https://perma.cc/ZZK3-FBGR] (discussing the fear of the Latino community 
following the shooting in El Paso); Michael Wilson, There Was No Gunfire in Times Square. But the 
Panic Was Still Real., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/nyregion/
shootings-panic-anxiety.html [https://perma.cc/9HN2-3B6H] (describing the panic in Times Square, 
described by one witness as a “war scene,” when a backfiring dirt bike was mistaken for gunfire days 
after the El Paso and Dayton shootings, resulting in twelve injuries). In response to these attacks, Senator 
Martha McSally and Representative Adam Schiff both put forward separate, but similar, proposals that 
would criminalize domestic terrorism. Barbara McQuade, Proposed Bills Would Help Combat Do-
mestic Terrorism, LAWFARE (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/proposed-bills-would-
help-combat-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/8K9W-MLPH]. 
 13 See Salma Elkhaoudi, Taylor Michael Wilson Pleads Guilty to Domestic Terrorism, but a Fed-
eral Law Is Still Lacking for Far-Right Extremists, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/07/20/taylor-michael-wilson-pleads-guilty-domestic-
terrorism-federal-law-still-lacking-far-right [https://perma.cc/JDD7-9VHM] (stating that there are 
specific attacks characterized as terrorism, such as attacking mass transportation systems, but there is 
no federal law criminalizing politically motivated violence as domestic terrorism); Ford, supra note 11 
(stating the charges against the El Paso shooter will not contain the words “domestic terrorism” because 
the law does not use that language); Mary B. McCord, It’s Time for Congress to Make Domestic Terror-
ism a Federal Crime, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-congress-make-
domestic-terrorism-federal-crime [https://perma.cc/A2F8-H6UW] (noting the lack of a federal statute 
criminalizing domestic terrorism and explaining the need for one); Ryan J. Reilly, There’s a Good 
Reason Feds Don’t Call White Guys Terrorists, Says DOJ Domestic Terror Chief, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/white-terrorists-domestic-extremists_us_5a
550158e4b003133ecceb74 [https://perma.cc/58Y7-7JQE] (paraphrasing Thomas Brzozowski, De-
partment of Justice’s counsel for domestic terrorism matters, explaining that there is no federal statute 
outlawing the definition of domestic terrorism found in the U.S. Code).  
342 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:339 
homa City.14 This changed after September 11, 2001 (9/11), when the main 
focus of law enforcement in the United States shifted to the threat posed by 
foreign Islamic extremists.15 In response to 9/11, drastic measures were taken 
to combat international threats, and the focus moved away from domestic ter-
rorism.16 During this time, the threat posed by right-wing extremism was large-
                                                                                                                           
 14 Jane Reitman, U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now They 
Don’t Know How to Stop It, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/
magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism-far-right.html [https://perma.cc/32QK-88DW] (de-
scribing the focus on domestic terrorism following the Oklahoma City bombing). In 1995, Timothy 
McVeigh, in response to the government siege in Waco, Texas, parked a truck rigged with explosives 
outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Jordan Steiker, Did the Oklahoma 
City Bombers Succeed?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 2001, at 185, 186 (describing 
the attack). The attack killed 168 people. Id. Timothy McVeigh was executed in 2001; it was the first 
execution by the federal government in thirty-eight years. Christopher S. Wren, McVeigh Is Executed 
for Oklahoma City Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/11/
national/mcveigh-is-executed-for-oklahoma-city-bombing.html [https://perma.cc/4U35-WF9W] (re-
porting the execution of Timothy McVeigh). Until the September 11 attacks in 2001, the bombing was 
the deadliest terrorist attack in United States history. Oklahoma City Bombing Commemorated, POLIT-
ICO (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/oklahoma-city-bombing-commemorated-
117123 [https://perma.cc/XE3A-NC49] (describing commemoration of the Oklahoma attack and 
noting it was the deadliest attack in United States history prior to 9/11).  
 15 Reitman, supra note 14 (stating that the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies fo-
cused on international terrorism following 9/11). 
 16 See Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1888 (2004) (describing the 
passage of the Patriot Act in response to 9/11); Daniel L. Byman, When to Call a Terrorist a Terror-
ist, BROOKINGS (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/29/when-
to-call-a-terrorist-a-terrorist/ [https://perma.cc/76JT-BN5U] (stating that after 9/11 the United States 
focused on Islamic extremism and less on right-wing violence). The 9/11 attacks had a profound effect 
on the nation. Steven Brill, Is America Any Safer?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/ [https://perma.cc/TP7F-HC3W] 
(describing the reaction and response to the 9/11 attacks). The response to 9/11 was drastic and fo-
cused on preventing another attack. See id. (detailing the response of the United States to 9/11 and the 
$1 trillion spent as of September 2016 to combat terrorism). Following 9/11, President Bush an-
nounced that the United States was at war with the terrorists who carried out the attacks. Ackerman, 
supra, at 1871 (quoting President Bush at the 2004 State of the Union as saying “terrorists and their 
supporters declared war on the United States, and war is what they got”). The United States launched 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan with the goal of destroying al-Qaeda—the terrorist group 
that orchestrated the attack—and the safe haven the Taliban gave them. Andrew Glass, U.S. Invades 
Afghanistan, Oct. 7, 2001, POLITICO (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/07/this-
day-in-politics-oct-7-2001-867332 [https://perma.cc/89NB-QLZE] (commemorating the United 
States’ invasion of Afghanistan). The war has become the longest in the history of the United States, 
and despite recent calls of President Trump to end the war, there are currently 14,000 troops still de-
ployed in Afghanistan. Josh Dawsey & Don Lamothe, Trump Wanted a Big Cut in Troops in Afghani-
stan. New U.S. Military Plans Fall Short, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/new-plans-for-afghanistan-would-have-trump-withdrawing-fewer-troops/
2019/01/08/ddf2858e-12a0-11e9-a896-f104373c7ffd_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z5YF-PE27] (not-
ing the large presence of United States troops in Afghanistan). The United States engaged in highly 
controversial practices in the name of protecting the country, including torture. See Jeremy Ashkenas 
et al., 7 Key Points from the C.I.A. Torture Report, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2014/12/09/world/cia-torture-report-key-points.html [https://perma.cc/D8HZ-42XH] 
(detailing the findings of the investigation into the torture practices of the CIA). There were numer-
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ly ignored.17 Despite the focus on international terrorism, however, right-wing 
extremism continued to pose a great threat.18 
Right-wing extremism can be defined as violence perpetrated by people 
who believe their personal or national way of life is being threatened.19 Right-
wing extremists often hold some or all of the beliefs of anti-globalism, racial 
supremacy, ethnic supremacy, nationalism, wariness of government, desire for 
personal liberty, and a belief that their way of life is being threatened.20 The 
                                                                                                                           
ous, drastic changes made to the government to adjust to the post-9/11 world, including assigning 
more FBI agents to national security, hiring more Border Patrol agents, reconstructing the air-
marshals program, upgrading screening at cargo ports, and creating the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). See generally Brill, supra (providing an analysis of the steps the government has 
taken following 9/11 to combat the threat posed by terrorism). The actions taken by the government 
have been successful, as there has not been another attack carried out by international terrorists close 
to the scale of 9/11. Lisa Monaco & Ken Wainstein, We’ve Declared War on Foreign Terrorism. Why 
Not Do the Same for Domestic Threats?, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/weve-declared-war-on-foreign-terrorism-why-not-do-the-same-for-domestic-threats/
2018/11/05/707c3d5c-e13a-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html [https://perma.cc/37J3-EPY9] (not-
ing that although the efforts of the United States following 9/11 have been successful as to foreign 
terrorism, the modern threat is radicalized individuals on domestic soil). 
 17 S. POVERTY LAW CTR., AGE OF THE WOLF: A STUDY OF THE RISE OF LONE WOLF AND LEAD-
ERLESS RESISTANCE TERRORISM 4–5 (2015) (stating that after 9/11 the government focused on ji-
hadists). A task force on preventing domestic terrorism established after the Oklahoma City bombing 
was scheduled to meet the morning of 9/11; the meeting did not happen, and the group remained inac-
tive until Attorney General Eric Holder re-launched it in 2014. Devlin Barrett et al., Federal Govern-
ment Has Long Ignored White Supremacist Threats, Critics Say, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-government-has-long-ignored-white-supremacist-threats-
critics-say/2017/09/02/bf2ed00c-8698-11e7-961d-2f373b3977ee_story.html [https://perma.cc/F42A-
VNNH] (describing the government’s practice of ignoring domestic terrorism). This was reflective of 
a trend in the Department of Justice to focus on Islamic terrorism and ignore the threats posed by far-
right violence. Id. (stating that the majority of the government’s resources have focused on Islamic 
extremists). Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman describes right-wing extremists as the “least consequen-
tial of all [the] terrorist group categories” that engage in “sporadic, and uncoordinated, seemingly 
mindless violence—fueled as much by beer and bravado as by a discernible political agenda.” BRUCE 
HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 230 (rev. and expanded ed., 2006) (describing right-wing violence 
dismissively, but noting they are not completely random nor unthinkingly indiscriminate). 
 18 Reitman, supra note 14 (describing the “renaissance” of the “militant far right” during the time 
the government was focused on combatting foreign Islamic groups).  
 19 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, IDEOLOG-
ICAL MOTIVATIONS OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970–2016, at 6 (2017) (describing the 
beliefs of right-wing extremists). White nationalists tend to believe that the white race is “endangered 
and face[s] extinction” because of immigration and inter-racial marriage. Id.; see also White National-
ist, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/
white-nationalist [https://perma.cc/9WA5-E8R7] (stating that white nationalists promote policies to 
fight against the loss of a white majority and return to the time before the Civil Rights Movement).  
 20 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 
19, at 6. Anti-globalism is a reaction to globalization, “the network of economic interconnection that 
became the dominant international system after the Cold War.” Liam Stack, Alt-Right, Alt-Left, Antifa: A 
Glossary of Extremist Language, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/
15/us/politics/alt-left-alt-right-glossary.html [https://perma.cc/DS6A-SEFC] (defining words commonly 
used by extremists). The alt-right’s “xenophobic, anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic” disdain for global-
ism is related to their fear that greater interconnectivity and openness will destroy their own culture. 
344 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:339 
rise of right-wing extremism was shown in a Homeland Security Intelligence 
Report that was largely criticized by Republicans when it was released in 
2009.21 
Domestic terrorism, highlighted by a rise in right-wing inspired attacks, 
poses a great threat to the United States.22 A spike in recent high-profile inci-
dents has brought concerns about domestic terrorism back into focus.23 The 
current laws of the United States are not adequately equipped to deal with this 
threat.24 The lack of a statute criminalizing domestic terrorism and the interna-
tional focus of many terrorism laws enacted in response to 9/11 leave many 
homegrown, domestic terrorists subject to criminal statutes unrelated to terror-
ism.25 The terror statutes in place are disproportionately used against offenders 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Hoffman describes right-wing terrorists’ fight as being against “social welfare policies and toler-
ance of diverse opinion—alongside its permitting of dark-skinned immigrants in the national labor 
force and of Jews and other minorities in positions of power or influence” and belief that “only by 
becoming politically, racially and culturally homogenous can the state recover its strength and again 
work for its natural citizens rather than the variegated collection of interlopers and parasites who now 
sap the nation of its strength and greatness.” See HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 236. 
 21 See OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RIGHTWING EXTREM-
ISM: CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN RADICALIZATION AND 
RECRUITMENT (2009) (warning against the rise of right-wing extremism); see also Dean Obeidallah, 
Home-Grown, Right-Wing Terrorism: The Hate the GOP Refuses to See, DAILY BEAST (June 11, 
2014), https://www.thedailybeast.com/home-grown-right-wing-terrorism-the-hate-the-gop-refuses-to-
see [https://perma.cc/7BZV-QPLD] (describing Republican outrage to the Homeland Security intelli-
gence assessment). 
 22 See Kimberly Kindy et al., In the United States, Right-Wing Violence Is on the Rise, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-the-united-states-right-wing-violence-is-
on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a-deb4-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html [https://perma.cc/LJF5-
YHE7] (noting the disproportionate amount of right-wing attacks compared to attacks carried out by 
Islamic extremists and left-wing extremists). 
 23 See generally Bruce Hoffman, Mail Bombs, Hate Crimes, and the Meaning of Terrorism, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/article/mail-bombs-hate-crimes-and-
meaning-terrorism [https://perma.cc/HE83-ZYAB] (explaining the meaning of terrorism under current 
law in light of recent attacks that have “raised the specter of hate and terrorism in the United States” 
and intensified public debate). 
 24 See Jesse J. Norris, Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under Federal Law, and Why It Matters, 
54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 262 (2017) (explaining that Dylann Roof was not charged with terrorism 
because there is not currently a statute criminalizing domestic terrorism); Kindy et al., supra note 22 
(describing the rise of right-wing violence); McCord, supra note 13 (describing the problems posed by 
the lack of a statute criminalizing domestic terrorism); see also S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 17, 
at 4–5 (describing the government’s focus on Islamic extremism). 
 25 JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOMESTIC TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW 5–6 
(2017) (stating the government often uses statutes relating to arson, firearms, explosives, fraud, 
threats, and hoaxes to prosecute perpetrators that the federal government considers to be domestic 
terrorists because no domestic terror statute exists). Christopher Hasson, a self-proclaimed white na-
tionalist described by prosecutors as a domestic terrorist, pled guilty to charges related to “firearms 
and the firearm silencers,” and possession of the drug tramadol after his arrest for planning to kill 
“journalists, Democratic politicians, professors, Supreme Court justices and those he described as 
‘leftists in general.’” Christine Hauser, Coast Guard Officer Called a ‘Domestic Terrorist’ Pleads 
Guilty to Gun and Drug Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/
us/christopher-hasson-coast-guard-white-supremacist.html [https://perma.cc/86FN-MVLJ]. 
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who espouse Islamic extremism, as these individuals can be connected to a 
foreign terrorist organization, even if they had no contact with that organiza-
tion.26 Despite this, there are also Islamic extremists who are able to avoid ter-
rorism charges and are subject to general criminal statutes.27 To ensure terror-
ists across the ideological spectrum are treated the same way by the laws of the 
United States, there must be a domestic terror law that criminalizes all domes-
tic terrorism, no matter the ideology espoused.28 
Part I of this Note looks at how the law currently addresses the topic of 
terrorism in the United States.29 Part II explores the gaps in the law and the 
effect these gaps have had on high profile incidents.30 Part III proposes a stat-
ute criminalizing domestic terrorism that would more appropriately address the 
current domestic terror threat the United States faces.31 
I. HOW THE LAW HANDLES DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Terrorism has had many faces and ideologies throughout the history of the 
United States.32 Today, the terrorism in the United States is in large part perpe-
                                                                                                                           
 26 See David Neiwert, Far-Right Extremists Have Hatched Far More Terror Plots Than Anyone 
Else in Recent Years, REVEAL (June 22, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/home-is-where-
the-hate-is/ [https://perma.cc/B47W-XZ64] (describing an Investigative Fund database that catalogues 
incidents of domestic terrorism, data that shows Islamic extremists were disproportionately charged 
with terrorism crimes). The ability to connect Islamic extremists to a foreign terrorist organization is 
relevant because of the material support statute, a widely used statute that criminalizes supporting a 
foreign terrorist organization and can be used to prosecute supporting the “propaganda apparatus in 
calls for violence.” See MICHAEL GERMAN & SARA ROBINSON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WRONG 
PRIORITIES ON FIGHTING TERRORISM 4 (2018) (describing the Department of Justice’s practice of 
classifying American Muslims as international terrorists because they are inspired by foreign terrorist 
organizations even if their only connection to a foreign group is reading or watching some form of 
propaganda); Richard C. Daddario & Brian Michael Jenkins, Think Mass Shootings Are Terrorism? 
Careful What You Wish for, POLITICO (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/
11/07/think-mass-shootings-are-terrorism-careful-what-you-wish-for-215797 [https://perma.cc/U7Y5-
RCMN] (describing the use of material support statutes and their broad application). In 2015, Mu-
hammad Abdulazeez was labeled a terrorist by then FBI director James Comey and described as being 
motivated by the propaganda of a foreign terrorist organization after killing three Marines and one 
member of the Navy in Tennessee. GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra, at 4. Abdulazeez was characterized 
in this way despite having worked independent of any foreign group and dying at the scene without 
leaving behind a reason for his actions. Id. The FBI admitted they did not know which group motivat-
ed him. Id. 
 27 See Susan Hennessey, The Good Reasons to Not Charge All Terrorists with Terrorism, LAW-
FARE (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/good-reasons-not-charge-all-terrorists-terrorism 
[https://perma.cc/ZT49-AQ8C] (describing the prosecution of Fort Hood shooter—who espoused a 
radical Islamic agenda—on general murder charges unrelated to terrorism and other similar cases). 
 28 See Byman, supra note 16 (stating that who a person kills in the name of does not matter; what 
matters is that the attacker had a political cause). 
 29 See infra notes 34–163 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes164–244 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 245–268 and accompanying text. 
 32 See KLANWATCH PROJECT, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., KU KLUX KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM 
AND VIOLENCE (6th ed. 2011) (detailing the activity of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the United States 
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trated by right-wing extremists.33 Section A of this Part goes over the statutory 
definition of domestic terrorism in the United States, the terrorism section of 
the criminal code, and examines how sentencing guidelines use terrorism to 
heighten penalties.34 Section B looks at modern threats of domestic terrorism 
stemming from within the United States, focusing on the large number of at-
tacks perpetrated by people who espouse ideologies other than radical Islam.35 
Section C looks at the growing threat of “lone wolf” terrorists and the use of 
the Internet to spread extremist ideologies of all kinds.36 Section D looks at 
how the current law has been used to prosecute those attacks.37 Section E ad-
dresses how the lack of an objective legal standard has led to the politicization 
of who can be classified as a terrorist.38 
A. Domestic Terrorism Law in the United States 
On October 26, 2001, the 107th Congress enacted the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).39 The goal of the Patriot Act 
was to prevent future terrorist attacks from occurring.40 The Patriot Act added 
                                                                                                                           
since its inception); Peter Chalk, U.S. Environmental Groups and ‘Leaderless Resistance,’ RAND 
CORP. (July 1, 2001), https://www.rand.org/blog/2001/07/u_s_-environmental-groups-and-leaderless-
resistance.html [https://perma.cc/A6VX-4WUE] (analyzing the threat posed by environmental extrem-
ists); Kat Eschner, How President William McKinley’s Assassination Led to the Modern Secret Service, 
SMITHSONIAN (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/how-president-william-
mckinleys-assassination-led-modern-secret-service-180964868/ [https://perma.cc/73KA-NQ2C] (noting 
that President McKinley was assassinated by an anarchist); Weather Underground Bombings, FBI, 
https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/weather-underground-bombings [https://perma.cc/QY42-
KA2M] (describing bombings carried out by the left-wing militant group the Weather Underground in 
the 1970s); supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing the United States’ efforts to combat 
foreign Islamic terror groups following 9/11). 
 33 See Reitman, supra note 14 (noting that the Anti-Defamation League found seventy-one per-
cent of “extremist-related fatalities in the United States between 2008 and 2017 were committed by 
members of the far right or white-supremacist movements”). 
 34 See infra notes 39–80 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 81–102 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 103–118 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 119–137 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 138–163 and accompanying text. 
 39 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) 
[hereinafter Patriot Act]. Following 9/11, it was believed that the United States needed more powers 
to properly carry out the “war on terrorism” and the act was quickly passed by Congress to supply 
them. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 1888. 
 40 COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND 
OBSTRUCT TERRORISM (PATRIOT) ACT OF 2001, H.R. DOC. NO. 107-236, at 41 (1st Sess. 2001) 
(noting that the “enhanced law enforcement tools and information sharing-provisions will assist in the 
prevention of future terrorist activities and the preliminary acts and crimes which further such activi-
ties”). 
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a definition for domestic terrorism to the United States Code.41 Domestic ter-
rorism is defined as activities that pose a danger to human life and violate the 
laws of the United States that occur primarily within the United States.42 The 
activities must be intended to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population,” in-
fluence government policy “by intimidation or coercion,” or affect the activi-
ties of the government by “mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”43 
The definition of domestic terrorism is largely the same as the definition of 
international terrorism, except that the act of terrorism occurs primarily within 
the United States.44 The intent for both international and domestic terrorism as 
defined in the statute are exactly the same and neither require a particular ideo-
logical motivation for the terrorist activity.45 
The Patriot Act gave the government expanded powers in combatting ter-
rorism, but it did not criminalize all the acts that fell within its own definition 
of terrorism.46 This has left the government without a statute to prosecute indi-
viduals fitting the Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism as domestic 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Patriot Act § 802. This definition is codified in section 2331 of the U.S. Code. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2331 (2012). “International terrorism” is currently defined as: 
[A]ctivities that (A) involve acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal law of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended – (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government 
by intimidation or coercion; (iii) or to affect the conduct of a government by mass de-
struction, assassination or kidnapping; (C) and occur primarily outside the territorial ju-
risdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means 
by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or co-
erce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). This definition has received criticism due to the potential to classify activ-
ist campaigns as domestic terrorists. See How the Patriot Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism,” 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.
cc/B67U-PVBK] (describing how the activities of legitimate activist groups such as Greenpeace and 
the Earth Liberation Front that break the law could potentially pose a danger to human life and be 
classified as domestic terrorism under the Act, and proposing criminalizing acts that “cause serious 
physical injury or death” rather than all acts that are dangerous to human life). But see BJELOPERA, 
supra note 25, at 11 (listing the Earth Liberation Front as a domestic terror threat). 
 43 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). 
 44 Compare id. (requiring that the act “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States”), with id. § 2331(1) (requiring that the act “occur primarily outside the territorial juris-
diction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their 
perpetrators operate or seek asylum”). 
 45 Id. §§ 2331(1), (5) (defining intent for both international and domestic terrorism). 
 46 See Norris, supra note 24, at 278 (describing the Patriot Act’s failure to criminalize acts that 
fall under the Act’s definition of terrorism, particularly the ideologically motivated shooting carried 
out by Roof). In addition to providing a definition of domestic terrorism, the Patriot Act contained 
provisions relating to surveillance, terrorism financing, border protection, investigating terrorism, 
providing relief for victims of terrorism, and improving the intelligence community. See Patriot Act 
§ 1 (listing the sections of the Act). 
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terrorists unless they commit one of the enumerated offenses in the Terrorism 
chapter of the criminal code, which does not include a general anti-terrorism 
law.47 Despite renewed calls for the criminalization of domestic terrorism by 
the public and politicians, the United States still does not have a statute that 
criminalizes all acts fitting within the Patriot Act’s definition.48 
Subsection 1 of this Section will look at the current federal “anti-terrorism 
laws.”49 Subsection 2 will look at the use of sentencing enhancements to impose 
greater punishment on people deemed to be terrorists.50 
1. Federal Terrorism Crimes 
Although there is no statute criminalizing domestic terrorism in the Unit-
ed States, there are a number of “anti-terrorism laws.”51 These laws are used to 
supplement other criminal statutes when prosecuting people accused of engag-
ing in terrorism.52 Many of these laws focus on international, as opposed to 
domestic, terrorism.53 Some of the criminal statutes prohibit specific terroristic 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (criminalizing specific acts, including: using a weapon of mass 
destruction; bombing a public place, government facility, public transportation system, or infrastruc-
ture facility; using a missile system designed to destroy aircraft; using radiological weapons; and 
using nuclear devices); Norris, supra note 24, at 278 (explaining Roof was not charged with domestic 
terrorism because there is no law criminalizing domestic terrorism). 
 48 See Michael Balsamo & Erick Tucker, Attacks Renew Debate: Should US Have Domestic Ter-
rorism Law?, FOX NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/us/attacks-renew-debate-should-
us-have-domestic-terrorism-law [https://perma.cc/8W85-NPPL] (acknowledging the recent debate 
around the lack of a domestic terror statute and describing the current state of the law); Ariel Ed-
wards-Levy et al., Americans Are Surprised Domestic Terrorism Isn’t a Federal Crime. Most Think It 
Should Be, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/domestic-
terrorism-federal-law-poll-doj-fbi_us_5acd1c78e4b09212968c8907 [https://perma.cc/Z5GG-T37A] 
(citing a survey conducted by the Huffington Post that found sixty-eight percent of Americans think 
domestic terrorism should be a crime); McQuade, supra note 12 (describing the proposed bills put 
forth by Senator McSally and Representative Schiff to criminalize domestic terrorism). See generally 
Rafia Zakaria, The Law Needs to Catch up with the Reality of Domestic Terrorism, CNN (Oct. 29, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/29/opinions/domestic-terrorism-legal-limitations-rafia-zakaria/
index.html [https://perma.cc/9G2G-QD56] (explaining the need for a domestic terrorism statute in 
light of recent right-wing extremism and citing officials that agree). 
 49 See infra notes 51–68 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 69–80 and accompanying text. 
 51 See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 6 (2008) (providing a summary 
of the current anti-terrorism laws and the other criminal laws used by law enforcement to combat 
terrorism). 
 52 Id. (describing the terrorism statutes in the United States and how they are used alongside other 
criminal statutes). These laws can be found in Chapter 113B of the United States criminal code. See 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D. 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (criminalizing murder or conspiracy to murder or cause serious bodily injury 
of a United States national outside the United States); id. § 2332D (criminalizing financial transac-
tions with a country that has been designated as one that supports international terrorism); id. § 2333 
(providing civil remedies for victims of international terrorism); id. § 2334 (providing jurisdiction for 
§ 2333); id. § 2335 (providing statute of limitations for actions brought under § 2333); id. § 2336 
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actions such as the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion.54 In the statutes prohibiting certain actions, the domestic components 
have caveats relating to interstate commerce in order to establish federal juris-
diction that the international components do not have.55 The Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act, enacted in 2006, specifically provides for the criminalization of 
terrorism aimed at an organization that sells or uses animals.56 The Animal En-
                                                                                                                           
(providing other limitations to § 2333); id. § 2337 (limiting action against the United States or foreign 
countries under § 2333); id. § 2339D (criminalizing the reception of military-type training from or on 
behalf of a foreign terrorist organization). 
 54 Id. § 2332A (criminalizing use or attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction); id. § 2332B 
(criminalizing terrorism that transcends national boundaries); id. § 2332F (criminalizing the bombing 
of government facilities, public places, public transportation, and infrastructure); id. § 2332G (crimi-
nalizing the use, possession, transfer, or production of “missile systems designed to destroy aircraft”); 
id. § 2332H (criminalizing the possession, use, creation, or transfer of weapons that release radiation); 
id. § 2332I (criminalizing the possession, use, or threat to use nuclear weapons); id. § 1992 (criminal-
izing terrorist attacks against railroads or other mass transportation systems). 
 55 Id. § 2332A (limiting jurisdiction for acts within the United States based on connection to or 
effect on interstate commerce); id. § 2332F (same); id. § 2332G (same); id. § 2332H (same). Section 
2332I does not contain these caveats. See id. § 2332I (granting jurisdiction if the specified conduct 
takes place within the United States). The Supreme Court has said these jurisdictional limitations 
require a finding that the matter has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. See United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (stating that possession of a gun at school does not affect interstate 
commerce and to hold so would convert authority under the Commerce Clause into general police 
power). It is not clear how significant of a hurdle these limitations are to terrorist prosecutions, as 
shown by the conviction of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev under 18 U.S.C. § 2332A. See Criminal Complaint at 
1–3, United States v. Tsarnaev, 945 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D. Mass. 2013) (13-2106-MBB) (stating the 
bombing had a “substantial impact on interstate and foreign commerce” because the attack forced the 
Boston Marathon to end early and forced many businesses in the area to close for multiple days); see 
also John Carney, Why the Boston Marathon Attack Is a Federal Crime, CNBC (Apr. 22, 2013), 
https://www.cnbc.com/id/100662216 [https://perma.cc/9D6N-RGZE] (noting the affidavit of the FBI 
agent in the criminal complaint emphasizes the commercial impact of the bombing because there is no 
evidence Tsarnaev did any traveling outside Massachusetts to carry out the attack). 
 56 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, Pub. L. 109-374, 120 Stat. 2652 (2006) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 43) (expanding the authority of the Department of Justice to combat and prosecute 
animal enterprise terrorism). The law criminalizes damaging property of an animal enterprise or 
someone associated with an animal enterprise, or places a person associated with an animal enterprise 
or their relatives in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury with the intent to damage or dis-
rupt the operations of the animal enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a). The Act provides for different penal-
ties depending on the level of economic damage caused and whether or not a person suffered serious 
bodily injury or was placed in reasonable fear of suffering seriously bodily injury. Id. § 43(b). For 
jurisdictional purposes, the person must use a facility of interstate or foreign commerce—such as the 
mail—or travel in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in the conduct covered 
by the Act. Id. § 43(a). This Act has been criticized for criminalizing non-violent acts as terrorism. See 
Ed Pilkington, Animal Rights ‘Terrorists’? Legality of Industry-Friendly Law to Be Challenged, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/19/animal-rights-activists-
challenge-federal-terrorism-charges [https://perma.cc/MC26-5VEP] (describing the charges against 
Kevin Johnson and Tyler Lang for terrorism under the Act for releasing 2,000 mink from cages, which 
their lawyers argued was an “inappropriate use of the concept of terrorism that threatens to stop free 
speech across the animal rights movement”).  
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terprise Act is the only statute specifically aimed at domestic terrorism.57 
Sections 2339A and 2339B of Chapter 18 of the U.S. Code are two of the 
most commonly used terrorism statutes.58 Section 2339A criminalizes provid-
ing or concealing “material support” with the intention that the support be used 
for a violation of a number of listed statutes.59 Section 2339B is also a “materi-
al support” statute, but prohibits providing such support for any “foreign ter-
rorist organization.”60 The statutes do not require that the perpetrator have an 
intent to support terrorism—just the knowledge that those whom they are sup-
porting are engaged in terrorism.61 “Material support or resources,” as defined 
by the statutes, is extremely broad and encompasses any property or service 
with the exception of medicine or religious materials.62 The acts of support 
need not be criminal themselves.63 Section 2339 criminalizes “harboring or 
concealing terrorists,” but lists certain statutes the person being concealed has 
to have violated or is about to violate rather than using the definitions of terror-
                                                                                                                           
 57 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 5 (stating that no existing federal statute criminalizes domestic 
terrorism, but that the Animal Enterprise Act is aimed at combating animal enterprise terrorism). 
 58 Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the 
(Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 5–6 (2005) (stating that the material 
support statutes have often been used since 9/11); Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terror-
ists, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 297, 297 (2008) (describing the laws implemented following 
the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and referring to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B as sections 
used more often than others).  
 59 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. The statutes listed in § 2339A are “specified crimes of terrorism.” Abrams, 
supra note 58, at 6. These statutes include, but are not limited to, prohibitions on developing chemical 
weapons (§ 229), damaging property of the United States (§ 1361), obstructing the national defense of 
the United States (§ 2155), and committing torture (§ 2340A) among others. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (list-
ing applicable statutes).  
 60 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The statute defines “terrorist organization” as a group classified as a terror-
ist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. § 2339B(g)(6). 
 61 Id. § 2339A (“knowing or intending that they are to be used”); id. § 2339B (“whoever know-
ingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”); Abrams, supra note 
58, at 6 (describing the mental state required to violate the acts).  
 62 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (defining material support or resources as “any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identifica-
tion, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious 
materials”); id. § 2339B(g)(4) (stating that the definition of material support is the same as in 
§ 2339A). The statutes cover a wide spectrum of conduct and can be used to prosecute non-violent 
acts that do not provide any real benefit to a terrorist organization or act. Kelly Berkell, Off-Ramp 
Opportunities in Material Support Cases, 8 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1, 21–22 (2017) (describing 
the applicability of material support statutes); see, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1, 4, 35–36 (2010) (finding the material support statute did not violate the free speech rights of two 
U.S. citizens and six domestic organizations that violated the statute by providing support such as 
monetary contributions, legal training, and political advocacy for the humanitarian and political activi-
ties of the PKK and LTTE, two terrorist organizations). 
 63 Abrams, supra note 58, at 6 (stating that the actions involved may be “minimal and outwardly 
non-criminal acts”). 
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ism provided in Section 2331 of the chapter.64 Section 2332B defines the term 
“federal crime of terrorism” for the purpose of granting investigative authority 
of such crimes to the Attorney General, but does not actually establish a feder-
al crime of terrorism.65 The definition of “federal crime of terrorism” is used in 
sentencing guidelines and will be looked at in more depth in the next Subsec-
tion.66 
The current terrorism laws in the United States could be drastically 
changed by two proposed bills that would criminalize domestic terrorism.67 
Both bills propose adding a section to Chapter 113B that criminalizes domestic 
terrorism, borrowing from the language of Section 2331 which currently de-
fines, but does not criminalize, domestic terrorism.68 
                                                                                                                           
 64 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (criminalizing concealing or harboring an individual who committed or is 
about to commit one of a number of listed statutes including violence against maritime navigation, 
arson and bombing of government property, and weapons of mass destruction, among others). 
 65 Id. § 2332B (defining federal crimes of terrorism and authorizing the Attorney General to in-
vestigate such crimes). For the purposes of § 2332B, a federal crime of terrorism is defined as an 
offense “that is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coer-
cion, or to retaliate against government conduct” that is in violation of one of the statutes listed in the 
section. Id. Notably, the section’s definition only includes acts that are intended to have an effect on 
government; it does not mention civilian populations. See id. (defining a federal crime of terrorism as 
one “calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government”). 
 66 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (stat-
ing that for the purpose of the sentencing guidelines the definition of “federal crime of terrorism” in 
18 U.S.C. § 2332B applies). 
 67 See McQuade, supra note 12 (describing proposed bills to criminalize domestic terrorism). 
Senator McSally and Representative Schiff have separately proposed criminalizing domestic terror-
ism, but their bills are almost identical. Id. 
 68 Id. The Senate bill proposed by Senator McSally would amend the U.S. Code to provide for 
varying levels of punishment for individuals who commit certain offenses, including: 
Whoever, in a circumstance described in subsection (b), and with the intent to intimi-
date or coerce a civilian population or influence, affect, or retaliate against the policy or 
conduct of a government—(1) kills any person . . . (2) kidnaps any person . . . (3) as-
saults any person with a deadly or dangerous weapon . . . (4) assaults any person in 
which serious bodily injury results therefrom . . . (5) creates a substantial risk of serious 
bodily injury to any other person by intentionally destroying or damaging any structure, 
conveyance, or other real or personal property . . . . 
OLL19717, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. § 1(a) (2019) (discussion draft). The bill would also criminalize 
attempting or conspiring to commit any of the offenses contained therein. Id. For the statute to apply, 
the offense must occur “against any person or property within the United States” and use or have an 
effect on interstate commerce; against the United States government; against United States property; 
or against “property within the United States that is owned, leased, or used by a foreign government.” 
Id. The statute also amends 18 U.S.C. § 2339A to include the crime of domestic terrorism. Id. § 1(c). 
The bill also calls for an annual joint report on domestic terrorism submitted by the Attorney General, 
the Director of the FBI, and the Secretary of Homeland Security. Id. § 2(a). The crime of domestic 
terrorism in the House Bill proposed by Representative Schiff is almost identical to the Senate Bill. 
See H.R. 4192, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. § 2(a) (2019). The proposed House Bill provides for more pro-
tections against abuse. See id. It provides a limitation that no person can be prosecuted under the pro-
posed Act without “written certification of the Attorney General or the highest-ranking subordinate of 
the Attorney General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions of the offenses in this chapter that, 
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2. Sentencing Enhancements 
Although there is no statute criminalizing domestic terrorism in the Unit-
ed States, sentencing enhancements have been used to further punish those 
who engage in it, but are convicted of general criminal statutes.69 Following 
the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, Congress expanded 18 U.S.C. § 3A1.4 to 
apply to domestic terrorism.70 United States sentencing guidelines state that if 
the defendant is convicted of a felony that included or was meant to support a 
“federal crime of terrorism,” the sentence given should be more severe.71 The 
sentencing guideline uses the definition of “federal crime of terrorism” estab-
lished in 18 U.S.C. § 2332B.72 Since the sentencing guidelines use this nar-
rower definition, it is not as broad as the definition of domestic terrorism found 
in Section 2331.73 The Patriot Act expanded the enhancement to include other 
offenses such as concealing a terrorist and obstructing an investigation into 
terrorism.74 These notes allow for an upward departure from the guidelines in 
certain circumstances, allowing for its application to crimes not enumerated in 
the definition of “federal crime of terrorism” and attacks intended to influence 
                                                                                                                           
in the judgement of the certifying official,” the offense was intended to further an ideological goal. 
See id. While Senator McSally’s proposal calls for an annual report on domestic terrorism in the coun-
try, Representative Schiff’s proposed bill calls for a report on civil liberties. See id. § 2(e)(1). It states 
that within four years of the Act’s enactment, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board estab-
lished by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 must publish a public report 
“on any civil liberties issues arising from the implementation” of the Act. Id. 
 69 Sameer Ahmed, Is History Repeating Itself? Sentencing Young American Muslims in the War 
on Terror, 126 YALE L.J. 1520, 1526 (2017) (stating that defendants convicted for “terrorism-related 
conduct” have been given very long sentences due to section 3A1.4 of the sentencing guidelines). 
 70 Id. at 1527 (stating that the enhancement was expanded to cover domestic terrorism in 1996); 
James P. McLoughlin, Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4: Sen-
tencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 28 LAW & INEQ. 
51, 60 (2010) (describing the changes to the sentencing enhancement after the Oklahoma City Bomb-
ing). 
 71 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a). The enhancement can have a very large 
effect on the suggested sentence. See Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 
477, 480 (2014) (stating that if the offense is found to be a federal crime of terrorism it triggers a 
“greatly enhanced punishment”).  
 72 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 n.1 (providing for increased offense levels 
for an offense that “involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism”). 
 73 See Norris, supra note 24, at 279 (describing the differences between the definition of domestic 
terrorism found in 18 U.S.C. § 2331 and the definition of “federal crime of terrorism” found in 
§ 2332B). “Federal crime of terrorism” does not include offenses where the intent is to influence the 
civilian population, only the government. 18 U.S.C. § 2332B. In addition to this limitation, one of the 
offenses enumerated in the statute must have been committed. Id. 
 74 Ahmed, supra note 69, at 1527–28 (stating the Patriot Act made the enhancement applicable to 
terrorism-related offenses including “(1) crimes involving terrorism but not falling within the statutory 
definition of ‘federal crime of terrorism’; (2) obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of terror-
ism; (3) harboring or concealing a terrorist; and (4) intending to influence the government’s conduct 
by intimidation or coercion, retaliate against government conduct, or influence a civilian population 
by intimidation or coercion”); McLoughlin, supra note 70, at 61 (describing the changes the Patriot 
Act made to the guidelines).  
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a civilian population.75 Section 3A1.4 does not consider the harm the individu-
al defendant was responsible for; the crime at issue may be a rudimentary step 
in the planning process.76 
There is also an aggravating factor concerning terrorism when juries con-
sider whether or not to sentence the defendant to death.77 When the offense at 
issue is homicide, an aggravating factor is whether the defendant planned and 
premeditated an act of terrorism.78 Non-statutory aggravating factors are also 
considered by the capital jury.79 Non-statutory factors relating to the defend-
ant’s purported terrorist activities have been used when considering the impo-
sition of the death penalty.80 
                                                                                                                           
 75 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 n.4 (stating that there can be an upward de-
parture from the guidelines if the act was intended to influence the government, but was not covered 
by one of the enumerated statutes, and if the act was covered by one of the enumerated statutes, but 
was intended to influence a civilian population rather than the government); Norris, supra note 24, at 
281–82 (describing the circumstances in which an upward departure from the guidelines is allowed). 
 76 Ahmed, supra note 69, at 1530 (stating that the terrorism enhancements do not account for 
whether or not the defendant’s actions caused harm); George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Con-
gress, the Sentencing Commission, the Guidelines, and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
517, 539 (2014) (describing the broad applicability of the sentencing enhancement and its applicabil-
ity to “inchoate steps along the way to acts of terrorism”). 
 77 Norris, supra note 24, at 282–83 (describing the aggravating factor for the death penalty). 
 78 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9). This section of the law does not say a federal crime of terrorism, and 
no definition of terrorism is given. See id. (omitting a definition of terrorism). 
 79 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL CAPITAL OFFENSES: AN OVERVIEW OF 
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW 16 (2011) (stating that the Federal Death Penalty Act allows 
non-statutory aggregating factors to be considered, although the jury must agree on at least one statu-
tory aggravating factor to sentence the defendant to death). Non-statutory aggravating factors are 
“approved by an individual court in a specific case but not listed in the jurisdiction’s death penalty 
statute.” Jeffrey L. Kircheier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary 
and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 375 (1998). Courts are 
allowed to “consider a wide range of non-statutory factors.” Id. at 376. There is a limitless amount of 
potential non-statutory aggravating factors. Id. at 379. There are fears that the limitless potential of 
non-statutory aggravating factors may lead to “unfettered jury discretion.” Id. at 381. 
 80 See Penalty Phase Jury Verdict at 12–13, United States v. Tsarnaev, 53 F. Supp. 3d 450 (D. 
Mass. June 27, 2013) (13–10200–GAO) (listing aggravating factors including two related to terrorism, 
whether “in conjunction with committing acts of violent terrorism, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev made state-
ments suggesting that others would be justified in committing additional acts of violence and terror-
ism against the United States” and whether “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev targeted the Boston Marathon, an 
iconic event that draws large crowds of men, women, and children to its final stretch, making it espe-
cially susceptible to the act and effects of terrorism”). The jury had to unanimously find that each 
factor was proven “beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to all the applicable counts.” Id. The jury 
found such regarding the targeting of the Boston Marathon, but did not regarding the statements en-
couraging additional acts. Id. 
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B. Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11 
It is difficult to definitively determine the number of domestic terror inci-
dents in the United States.81 The United States government does not publish an 
official and public list of domestic terrorist organizations.82 Additionally, since 
many individuals, who would be considered domestic terrorists by federal 
agencies, are often charged with crimes unrelated to terrorism, it is difficult to 
determine how many terrorist incidents there are.83 The Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation’s (FBI) Most Wanted list of domestic terrorists contains twelve in-
dividuals, only one of whom, an alleged member of the Earth Liberation Front, 
is wanted for an action that took place after 9/11.84 While there is no official 
list of organizations or individuals considered domestic terrorists, the Depart-
ment of Justice has published a list of domestic terrorism threats in a white 
paper from 2006.85 The threats listed are animal rights extremists, eco-
terrorists, anarchists, anti-government extremists, black separatists, white su-
premacists, and anti-abortion extremists.86 As noted in a Congressional Re-
                                                                                                                           
 81 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 5 (describing the difficulty of assessing domestic terrorism 
trends in the United States). 
 82 Id. at 9. This is not true of foreign organizations which can be officially designated as foreign 
terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act. Id. at 9–10. There are currently sixty-eight organizations designated as foreign terrorist 
organizations by the Secretary of State. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [https://perma.cc/LM4G-N79M] (listing foreign terrorist 
organizations, including the recently designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). 
 83 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 5 (describing the difficulty of counting terrorism cases with-
out a federal statute criminalizing domestic terrorism). There are times when individuals the FBI con-
siders domestic terrorists do not violate federal crimes, resulting in a state handling the case which 
makes it more difficult to fully grasp the scope of domestic terrorism in the United States. Id. at 5–6. 
 84 FBI Most Wanted, Domestic Terrorism, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt [https://perma.
cc/MM8V-QRDC]. The list includes Donna Joan Borup for a violent anti-apartheid demonstration in 
1981, George Edward Wright for the 1972 hijacking of a plane, Josephine Sunshine Overaker who 
was indicted in 2006 for her activity with the Earth Liberation Front dating back to 1996, Cheri 
Laverne Dalton for her role in a 1981 bank robbery, Catherine Marie Kerkow for her role in the 1972 
hijacking of a plane, Elizabeth Anna Duke for her involvement with a communist organization in the 
1970s and 1980s, Leo Frederick Burt for his involvement with a bombing in 1970, William Morales 
for his involvement with an extremist Puerto Rican independence organization in the 1970s and 
1980s, Ishmail Muslim Ali for the hijacking of a plane in 1984, Jose Espinosa Caballero for his in-
volvement in the hijacking of a plane in 1980, Eduardo Guerra Jimenez for his role in the hijacking of 
a plane in 1979, and Ambrose Henry Montfort for his role in the 1983 hijacking of a plane. Id. 
 85 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 10. 
 86 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 59 (2006) (listing domestic terror 
threats). Islamic extremism is not listed as a domestic terrorism threat because the FBI only classifies 
groups with American inspired ideology as domestic terrorists. See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 4 
(describing the FBI’s definition and stating the FBI’s shorthand definition of domestic terrorism is 
“Americans attacking Americans based on U.S.-based extremist ideologies”). Despite this, when not-
ing the importance of fighting domestic terrorism, the Department of Justice’s white paper references 
the attack on the British subway system as an example of “individuals disaffected from mainstream 
society who are turning to terrorism.” See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra, at 59. The attackers espoused an 
Islamic extremist ideology. See Seven Years Since 7/7, THE ECONOMIST (July 6, 2012), https://www.
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search Service report from 2017, one of the only public sources where the FBI 
lists and describes domestic terrorism ideologies is a website for teenagers ti-
tled “Don’t Be a Puppet.”87 
Although the federal government does not provide a list of domestic ter-
rorism organizations or incidents, there are a number of private organizations 
that have documented domestic terrorism in the United States.88 The National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
publishes the Global Terrorism Database, which contains information on ter-
rorist attacks that have occurred around the world.89 START research has 
                                                                                                                           
economist.com/blighty/2012/07/06/seven-years-since-7/7 [https://perma.cc/DM6J-X93M] (describing 
the London underground bombings on July 7, 2005, known as the 7/7 attacks). This indicates that they 
would not fall under the Department of Justice’s own definition of domestic terrorism, even though 
they are discussed in the white paper’s section on domestic terrorism. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra, at 
59 (“As with the British homegrown terrorists who bombed the London subway system, an increasing 
number of investigations indicate that we share this problem of individuals disaffected from main-
stream society who are turning to terrorism.”); BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 4 (describing the FBI’s 
definition of domestic terrorism). There are ideologies that have inspired attacks not included in the 
list of threats, including incel extremists. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra, at 59 (listing examples of 
threats of domestic terrorism); Hailey Branson-Potts & Richard Winton, How Elliot Rodger Went 
from Misfit Mass Murderer to ‘Saint’ for Group of Misogynists—and Suspected Toronto Killer, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-elliot-rodger-incel-20180426-
story.html [https://perma.cc/TT9W-YA9E] (detailing the attack of Elliot Rodger in California and 
describing the incel belief that women who deny them sex are committing a crime).  
 87 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 10 n.55 (describing the Don’t Be a Puppet website); see also 
Don’t Be a Puppet, FBI, https://cve.fbi.gov/whatare/?state=domestic [https://perma.cc/L2KG-DKTD] 
(listing sovereign citizen extremists, animal rights extremists, environmental extremists, anarchist 
extremists, abortion extremists, militia extremists and white supremacy extremists). The Don’t Be a 
Puppet page does not list black separatists as a domestic extremist ideology, and lists abortion extrem-
ists from various ideologies instead of just anti-abortion extremists. See Don’t Be a Puppet, supra. 
The website does not list any particular groups that commit crimes to advance those ideologies. See 
id. 
 88 See Richard E. Berkebile, What Is Domestic Terrorism? A Method for Classifying Events from 
the Global Terrorism Database, 29 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 1, 2 (2017) (listing Extremist 
Crime Database and American Terrorism Study as two databases on domestic terrorism in America); 
About the GTD, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/ [https://
perma.cc/S3SM-LLLN] (describing the database as a collection of terrorist attacks around the world 
and claiming to be “the most comprehensive unclassified database” relating to terrorist attacks in the 
world); Terrorism in America After 9/11, NEW AM., https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-
in-america/ [https://perma.cc/E25R-WLK4] (describing itself as “a comprehensive, up-to-date source 
of online information about terrorist activity in the United States and by Americans overseas since 
9/11). 
 89 About the GTD, supra note 88. From 2012 to 2017, the Global Terrorism Database was funded 
by DHS and the U.S. State Department. GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, https://www.start.umd.edu/
gtd/?_sm_au_=iVVWLZqH8Wrk5Hq [https://perma.cc/D4H6-HC5L]. The State Department recently 
took away the Database’s funding. Erin Miller, Message from the Global Terrorism Database Man-
ager, START (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.start.umd.edu/news/message-global-terrorism-database-
manager [https://perma.cc/3UG3-C7PX] (informing users of the loss of funding despite only positive 
feedback from the Bureau of Counterterrorism). The Database does not explicitly differentiate be-
tween domestic and international terrorism, but one can manipulate the dataset to view domestic ter-
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shown that the attacks from the past two decades have been consistent with the 
pattern in the United States since the 1970s of many non-lethal attacks that are 
highlighted by a few mass casualty incidents.90 According to START, 3,187 
Americans died from terrorism in the United States, the vast majority on 9/11 
when 913 Americans lost their lives.91 Between 2002 and 2009, twenty-one 
Americans died from terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.92 During this time, accord-
ing to START’s Global Terrorism Database there were a total of 140 terrorist 
incidents, 108 of which were considered successful.93 From 2010 to 2017 that 
number drastically increased to 253 deaths.94 According to the Global Terror-
                                                                                                                           
ror. See Berkebile, supra note 88, at 4 (explaining the Global Terrorism Database and the ability of 
researchers to refine the data). 
 90 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 
19, at 5 (describing the pattern of lethality in attacks). Ninety-one percent of the attacks in the United 
States between 1970 and 2016 have been non-lethal. Id. 
 91 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, AMERI-
CAN DEATHS IN TERRORIST ATTACKS, 1995-2017 (2018) (listing American deaths by year). The data 
set does not differentiate between international and domestic terror incidents. See id. (stating the num-
bers represent total number of terrorist attacks). 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Search Results for Attacks 2002–2009, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, https://bit.ly/31bz
31L [https://perma.cc/6DKS-LMBA] (searching for all attacks between 2002 and 2009 that took place in 
the United States); Search Results for Successful Attacks 2002-2009, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, 
https://bit.ly/2O6Llms [https://perma.cc/4XFE-5D4G] (searching for successful attacks between 2002 
and 2009 that took place in the United States). The database does not list the nationality of the perpetrator 
of incidents and sometimes cannot identify the perpetrator, so it is not clear from the data how many of 
these incidents were domestic. Berkebile, supra note 88, at 13. 
 94 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, supra note 
91. Two high-casualty incidents inflate the number of deaths in this time: the killing of fifty-four 
Americans in Las Vegas by Stephen Paddock and the killing of fifty people at Pulse Night Club in 
Orlando—though it is not clear how many victims of these incidents were American citizens. See 
David Agren, Orlando Shooting: At Least Four Mexicans Among the Dead, THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/14/orlando-shooting-pulse-attack-four-mexicans-
among-the-dead [https://perma.cc/2LQN-8QGH] (stating there were at least four victims from Mexi-
co); Fiona Ortiz & Letitia Stein, Hispanics Shaken by Heavy Toll at Orlando Club Massacre, REU-
TERS (June 13, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-florida-shooting-latinos/hispanics-shaken-
by-heavy-toll-at-orlando-club-massacre-idUSKCN0YZ2GH [https://perma.cc/V8MJ-J439] (stating 
the Dominican foreign relations ministry confirmed one victim was from the Dominican Republic); 
Coroner Releases Names of All 58 Las Vegas Shooting Victims, LAS VEGAS SUN (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/oct/05/coroner-releases-names-all-58-las-vegas-shooting/ [https://
perma.cc/5EZ4-96XG] (listing the fifty-eight people who died in the massacre and noting four of them 
were Canadian). This number may be an overestimate; no clear motive has been found in the Las Vegas 
attack, but the Global Terrorism Database classifies it as terrorism. See GTD ID: 201710010018, GLOB-
AL TERRORISM DATABASE, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=2017
10010018 [https://perma.cc/JH2J-EJ2P] (describing the attack and classifying it as unambiguously 
terrorism); see also Jason Wilson, New Documents Suggest Las Vegas Shooter Was Conspiracy Theo-
rist—What We Know, THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/
may/19/stephen-paddock-las-vegas-shooter-conspiracy-theories-documents-explained [https://perma.
cc/5MU3-6Q56] (stating Paddock held anti-government beliefs). But see JOSEPH LOMBARDO, SHER-
RIFF, LVMPD PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 1 OCTOBER / MASS CASUALTY SHOOTING 52 
(2018) (stating that there is no evidence that Paddock carried out the attack in the name of a specific 
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ism Database, there were 267 terrorist incidents during this time, 233 of which 
were successful.95 According to a Washington Post analysis of the Global Ter-
rorism Database, ninety-two of these incidents were committed by right-wing 
extremists, thirty-eight were carried out by Islamic extremists, thirty-four were 
committed by left-wing extremists, and the remaining were carried out by at-
tackers whose motives were unknown or unclear.96 According to START’s 
analysis of their Extremist Crime Database, since 9/11 through 2016, there 
were thirty-one events of Islamic extremism resulting in 119 deaths compared 
to eighty-nine events of far-right extremism resulting in 158 deaths.97 
The Investigative Fund at the Nation Institute, together with Reveal at the 
Center for Investigative Reporting, published a study collecting data on do-
mestic terrorism over a span of nine years, from 2008 to 2016.98 The Center 
states there were sixty-three incidents of Islamic extremism inspired domestic 
terrorism, 66% of which were unsuccessful.99 Over the same period of time, 
the Center documented 115 incidents of right-wing inspired domestic terror-
ism, 35% of which were unsuccessful.100 The right-wing inspired incidents 
during this time resulted in death 33% of the time, compared to 13% of the 
                                                                                                                           
ideology or terrorist organization, and he left no manifesto or rationale for the attack); Jennifer Medi-
na & Julie Turkewitz, Las Vegas Police Release Final Report on Massacre, With Still No Idea of 
Motive, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/03/us/las-vegas-shooting-
final-report.html [https://perma.cc/W5GZ-F82E] (describing the final report and the lack of any signs 
of a motive for the attack). 
 95 See Search Results for Attacks 2010-2017, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, https://bit.ly/
2uELbvM [https://perma.cc/EEW3-7T5W] (searching for all attacks between 2010 and 2017 in the Unit-
ed States); Search Results for Successful Attacks 2010-2017, GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, https://
bit.ly/36Ewc2t [https://perma.cc/VP7N-FSM3] (searching for all successful attacks between 2010 and 
2017 in the United States). 
 96 Kindy, supra note 22. 
 97 NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, ISLAMIST 
AND FAR-RIGHT HOMICIDES IN THE UNITED STATES (2017) (listing deaths from Islamist and far-right 
attacks). 
 98 Darren Ankrom et al., Homegrown Terror, REVEAL (June 22, 2017), https://apps.revealnews.
org/homegrown-terror [https://perma.cc/34BD-X3H2] (describing the study). The Center for Investi-
gative Reporting was founded in 1977 and claims to be one of the most credible media organizations 
in the country. About Us, REVEAL, https://www.revealnews.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/MTL5-
CLR6]. The Center publishes their reporting on the “Reveal” website. Id. The Investigative Fund at 
the Nation Institute has been renamed Type Investigations. Mission, TYPE INVESTIGATIONS, https://
www.typeinvestigations.org/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/X4VD-T9W9]. Type Investigations is 
an organization that works with independent reporters. Id. David Neiwert has provided the sources 
used in the study and the methodology of deciding whether an incident qualified as terrorism. See 
generally David Neiwert, How We Analyzed Domestic Terror Incidents, REVEAL (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.revealnews.org/blog/how-we-analyzed-domestic-terror-incidents/ [https://perma.cc/M5QL-
6Q9B] (describing the methodology of the study). 
 99 Neiwert, supra note 26. 
 100 Id. 
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Islamic extremist inspired incidents.101 The study noted that there were only 
nineteen left-wing inspired events that resulted in seven deaths.102 
C. Wolves on the Internet 
One trend in terrorist attacks is the rise of “lone wolf terrorism.”103 In 
2011, President Obama stated that lone wolf terrorists pose a greater threat to 
the United States then a large-scale attack by a group.104 Similar to the term 
terrorism, “lone wolf terrorism” lacks a precise definition.105 Despite this, 
many definitions embrace the notion that a “lone wolf terrorist” is one that acts 
entirely on his or her own to further an ideology, even if that ideology is held 
by a larger group.106 There have been a number of high profile attacks where 
the attackers were motivated by Islamic extremism espoused by groups like 
ISIS and al-Qaeda, but unlike 9/11, many of the perpetrators have been Ameri-
can nationals with no actual connection to the groups.107 Lone wolves also play 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Id. The study notes that Islamist inspired incidents resulted in more deaths in large part due to 
the mass shooting at Fort Hood. Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Khaled A. Beydoun, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Types, Stripes, and Double Standards, 112 NW. U. 
L. REV. 187, 193 (2018) (stating that there has been a 143% increase in lone wolf terrorist attacks 
from 1970 to the 2000s); Daniel L. Byman, How to Hunt a Lone Wolf: Countering Terrorists Who Act 
on Their Own, BROOKINGS (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-to-hunt-a-lone-
wolf-countering-terrorists-who-act-on-their-own/ [https://perma.cc/JVM7-LHWV]. 
 104 Laura MacInnis, Obama Says “Lone Wolf Terrorist” Biggest U.S. Threat, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 
2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obama-security/obama-says-lone-wolf-terrorist-biggest-
u-s-threat-idUSTRE77F6XI20110816 [https://perma.cc/XEU4-2W5V] (quoting President Obama as 
saying, “the most likely scenario we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone 
wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack”). 
 105 Beydoun, supra note 103, at 192. 
 106 See MARK S. HAMM & RAMON SPAAJJ, THE AGE OF LONE WOLF TERRORISM 5 (2017) (stat-
ing “lone wolf terrorism refers to terrorist actions carried out by lone individuals, as opposed to those 
carried out on the part of terrorist organizations or state bodies” and that such an individual “is solitary 
in nature and prefers to act totally alone, although his or her radicalization to action may be spurred by 
violent media images, incendiary books, manifestos, and fatwas”); S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 
17, at 7 (stating that a lone wolf terrorist is “a person who carries out a terrorist attack entirely on his 
own”); Beydoun, supra note 103, at 193–94 (quoting the Georgetown University Security Studies 
Program that defines lone wolf terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through 
violence or threat of violence committed by a single actor, who pursues political change linked to a 
formulated ideology, whether his own or that of a larger organization, and who does not receive or-
ders, direction, or material support from outside sources” and proposing a new definition of lone wolf 
terrorism that is “premeditated violence unleashed by an individual actor driven by discretely held 
views or a cogent ideology espoused by an organization”). 
 107 See Gilsinan, supra note 7 (stating that modern terrorism is largely homegrown and even Islamic 
extremists are often U.S. citizens or permanent residents). There are numerous examples of this is in 
recent high-profile attacks. See Greg Miller & Scott Wilson, No Links Seen Between Boston Suspects and 
Foreign Terrorist Groups, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/no-links-seen-between-boston-suspects-and-foreign-terrorist-groups-
officials-say/2013/04/23/f08c9b7e-ac4b-11e2-b6fd-ba6f5f26d70e_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZP7A-
BAAF] (stating that while Dzhokhar Tsarnaev admitted to being influenced by extremist Islamist 
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a prominent role in white supremacist violence.108 Despite the prevalence of 
lone wolves of all ideologies, Muslims tend to be branded as lone wolf terror-
ists while white perpetrators are labeled lone wolf killers.109 
The ability of an ideology or group to attract followers who carry out lone 
wolf attacks has been helped by the growth of the Internet, which provides a 
platform for individuals to spread their message.110 Both Islamic extremist 
groups and domestic ideologies have used the Internet and social media to 
spread their ideology and recruit new followers.111 United States citizens in-
spired by Islamic extremism are considered international terrorists by the De-
partment of Justice.112 These individuals may have no contact with a foreign 
organization outside of visiting certain websites.113 Similarly, white suprema-
cists have used the Internet to spread their ideology and influence others who 
may carry out an attack on their own.114 White supremacists’ activities online 
                                                                                                                           
ideology there was no connection to any foreign terrorist groups); Emily Palmer & Benjamin Weiser, 
Akayed Ullah Guilty of ISIS-Inspired Bombing Near Times Square, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/nyregion/port-authority-bombing-verdict.html [https://perma.
cc/9ZN7-BMF3] (describing how the man who detonated a pipe bomb in Times Square stated that he 
did not carry out the attack for ISIS and said the government was “trying to put [him] in a group, 
which [he] d[idn’t] support”); Richard Perez-Pena & Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Treating San Ber-
nardino Attack as Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/
05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html [https://perma.cc/PV3F-Q9XJ] (stating that despite ISIS 
claiming their supporters carried out the San Bernardino attack there is no indication the attackers 
were part of a network). 
 108 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 53. 
 109 See Beydoun, supra note 103, at 190 (referencing the characterizations of Stephen Paddock, a 
white man classified as a lone wolf killer, after the 2017 Las Vegas shooting and Omar Mateen, a 
middle eastern man classified as a lone wolf terrorist, after the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting). 
 110 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 49 (stating that “the internet allows individuals and groups to con-
nect with each other and disseminate ideology”); Daniel L. Byman, Can Lone Wolves Be Stopped?, 
BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/03/15/can-lone-wolves-
be-stopped [https://perma.cc/LK4P-GV22] (stating that a small group can reach a wide audience with 
the Internet). 
 111 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 48 (describing the online presence of Islamic extremists and 
domestic terrorists); Emily B. Tate, Note, “Maybe Someone Dies”: The Dilemma of Domestic Terror-
ism and Internet Edge Provider Liability, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1731, 1747 (2019) (describing the rise of 
domestic terrorism and partially attributing the rise to the use of the Internet and social media). 
 112 GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 4 (describing the treatment of individuals inspired by 
Islamic extremist ideology). This extends to a perception that Islamic terrorism is perpetrated by for-
eign terrorists while domestic attacks are committed by “dysfunctional young white guys from subur-
bia” and that “there is no Osama Bin Laden to hunt down on this front, only our sons and brothers.” 
Kevin D. Williamson, White-Boy al-Qaeda, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.
com/corner/el-paso-dayton-shootings-domestic-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/63MK-URV2] (arguing 
that while recent attacks such as El Paso should be considered terrorism, the threat is fundamentally 
different than Islamic terror). 
 113 See GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 4 (describing the actions needed to be classified 
as a foreign terrorist, such as watching an online video or going to certain websites). 
 114 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 48–49 (describing white supremacist use of the Internet to 
create “free spaces” to discuss their views); The Editors, Crush This Evil, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/08/el-paso-shooting-white-supremacy-evil-ideology/ [https://
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form a community similar to Islamic extremist movements.115 According to a 
George Washington University study, white nationalist movements are much 
more active on Twitter than ISIS supporters.116 The difficulty in combating the 
use of the Internet to espouse white supremacist ideology and recruit new fol-
lowers is that the websites and accounts often claim they are not violent and 
there are laws that protect the sites from facing liability for what their users 
post.117 Despite this, there have been a number of documented cases where 
websites used by white nationalists were frequented by and inspired individu-
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/QFB2-L7JQ] (stating, “the patterns on display over the last few years have revealed that we 
are contending here not with another ‘lone wolf,’ but with the fruit of a murderous and resurgent ide-
ology—white supremacy—that deserves to be treated by the authorities in the same manner as has 
been the threat posed by militant Islam”).  
 115 Rita Katz, ISIS Hunter: Time to Wake Up to the White Nationalist Terror Threat, DAILY 
BEAST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/isis-hunter-time-to-wake-up-to-the-white-
nationalist-terror-threat [https://perma.cc/48HH-R68E] (stating that the white supremacist community 
recruits online and furthers its message through propaganda, similar to jihadist sites). The website 
Daily Stormer, an online forum for white nationalists, has over 240,000 members. Id. 
 116 J.M. BERGER, GEO. WASH. PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, NAZIS VS. ISIS ON TWITTER: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF WHITE NATIONALISTS AND ISIS ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS 3 (2016) 
(stating that white nationalists outperform ISIS in almost every metric on Twitter including followers 
and number of tweets per day). 
 117 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 49; Drew Harwell, Three Mass Shootings This Year Began with 
a Hateful Screed on 8chan. Its Founder Calls It a Terrorist Refuge in Plain Sight., WASH. POST (Aug. 
4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/04/three-mass-shootings-this-year-
began-with-hateful-screed-chan-its-founder-calls-it-terrorist-refuge-plain-sight/ [https://perma.cc/
YFV8-H7W8]. According to current law, “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012). Moderators on the white-nationalist website Stormfront, where 
Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik first posted his manifesto, constantly delete threads debating the 
righteousness of Breivik’s attacks because the site has a policy against posts that promote violence or 
illegal acts. J.M. Berger, The Dangerous Spread of Extremist Manifestos, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 26, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/christopher-hasson-was-inspired-breivik-
manifesto/583567/ [https://perma.cc/UK2S-D2XG] (describing the ease with which online manifestos 
are spread). Andrew Anglin, the founder of Daily Stormer, provides instructions for those who read 
the site on how to harass targets. See Luke O’Brien, The Making of an American Nazi, THE ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/the-making-of-an-american-
nazi/544119/ [https://perma.cc/J6RS-EJDG] (detailing the tactics of Anglin and his targets, including 
John Goldberg and David French, two prominent conservative writers, as well as the author of the 
article cited). In these instructions, he explicitly tells his followers not to use or threaten violence to 
protect themselves from legal liability. Id. Despite the activities of Anglin being limited to trolling, 
numerous people who visited the website have acted violently to further the ideologies being es-
poused, including Roof, Thomas Mair (who stabbed a member of Parliament in the United Kingdom), 
James Harris Jackson (who stabbed an African American in New York City), and Devon Arthurs 
(who was a former Neo-Nazi and killed two of his roommates who were still Neo-Nazis). Id. The 
owner of 8chan, a site that has gained notoriety for its involvement with right-wing terrorism, has 
called the site “a refuge for free speech online” and called the Christchurch shooter a “criminal alien.” 
Harwell, supra. The now disassociated founder of 8chan stated the message board “is a receptive 
audience for domestic terrorists.” Id. In light of mounting criticism, the site placed the message “Em-
brace Infamy” on its homepage. Id. 
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als who carried out attacks in the name of that ideology, including recent at-
tacks in El Paso, Texas; Christchurch, New Zealand; and Baerum, Norway.118 
D. How the Legal System Has Dealt with Domestic Terror  
Attacks in the United States Post-9/11 
Similar to the difficulty in analyzing the level of domestic terror activity 
in the United States, it is difficult to fully analyze the federal government’s 
efforts in fighting domestic terrorism.119 There is not a uniform way in which 
activities that could be considered domestic terrorism are prosecuted in the 
United States.120 The attacks that have been perpetrated since 9/11 have been 
prosecuted using a mixture of general criminal statutes, and where the gov-
ernment thinks appropriate, one of the terroristic crimes of the criminal 
code.121 Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors will often label people as 
“extremists,” allowing them to avoid labeling and prosecuting them as terror-
ists.122 Due to this practice of using the terrorism chapter of the criminal code 
                                                                                                                           
 118 BERGER, supra note 116, at 4 (noting Roof and Breivik as two examples of white nationalist 
terrorists who were active online). Prior to attacking the Walmart in El Paso, Patrick Crusius pub-
lished a manifesto on 8chan, an online messaging board frequented by extremists. Gianluca Mez-
zofiore & Donie O’Sullivan, El Paso Mass Shooting Is at Least the Third Atrocity Linked to 8chan 
This Year, CNN (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/04/business/el-paso-shooting-8chan-
biz/index.html [https://perma.cc/CL3E-QYRC]. Similarly, Brenton Tarrant posted a manifesto to 
8chan before he carried out an attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, killing fifty-one people. Id. Tarrant 
wrote in his manifesto he was inspired by Roof and Breivik. Jelani Cobb, The New Zealand Shooting and 
the Great-Man Theory of Misery, NEW YORKER (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
daily-comment/the-new-zealand-shooting-and-the-great-man-theory-of-misery [https://perma.cc/HK87-
L6J2]. Patrick Crusius cited the Christchurch massacre as inspiration. Mezzofiore & O’Sullivan, su-
pra. A few days after the El Paso shooting, Philip Manshaus published a manifesto announcing his 
attack to “increase the racial war” on Endchan, an online forum. Terrorangrepet i Baerum, VG (Aug. 
10, 2019), https://www.vg.no/spesial/2019/angrepet-paa-al-noor-moskeen-i-baerum/ [https://perma.
cc/28KD-4N6K]. He attempted to enter a mosque with multiple weapons before he was stopped by 
worshipers Mohammed Rafique and Mohammed Iqbal Javel who managed to subdue Manshaus, 
saving numerous lives. Id. Prior to the attack, Manshaus made posts on Endchan praising the El Paso 
shooter, a man charged with killing one person at a California synagogue, and stating he was “chosen” 
by the Christchurch shooter. Emma Anderson, Norway Attack ‘Inspired’ By Christchurch, El Paso 
Shootings: Report, POLITICO (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.politico.eu/article/norway-attack-suspect-
inspired-by-christchurch-el-paso-shootings-report/ [https://perma.cc/264W-YWET]. 
 119 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 8 (discussing the inconsistencies in terror prosecutions). 
 120 Id. at 5–6 (describing how domestic terrorism is currently prosecuted with general criminal 
statutes). 
 121 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2012); Hennessey, supra note 27 (describing the prosecution of 
terrorists using general criminal statutes); ZABEL & BENJAMIN, JR., supra note 51, at 6 (describing the 
laws used to prosecute terrorism). 
 122 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 8 (describing the use of extremism instead of terrorism and the 
flexibility that it provides federal officials). After Roof carried out his attack, the government did not 
unambiguously state it was terrorism. Norris, supra note 24, at 265–66 (describing the Department of 
Justice’s labeling of the attack). After the attack, a group of senators sent a letter to Senator Chuck 
Grassley, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, calling for a hearing on domestic terrorism and 
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to prosecute certain individuals as terrorists, while labeling others as extremists 
and charging them with crimes completely unrelated to terrorism, it is difficult 
to analyze how the United States has prosecuted terrorism.123 Further compli-
cating the task of analyzing how the legal system has handled domestic terror-
ism in the United States, a report published in 2009 highlighted great discrep-
ancies in how the federal courts, the National Security Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, and federal prosecutors classified terrorists.124 
According to the database released by the Investigative Fund at the Na-
tion Institute and Reveal from the Center of Investigative Reporting, Islamist 
inspired incidents have been subject to more terrorist and federal charges than 
non-Islamist inspired incidents.125 The study found 48.6% of the Islamist in-
spired events they documented were the result of sting operations, compared to 
12% of far-right inspired incidents and 10.5% of far-left inspired incidents.126 
Eighty-four percent of the Islamist inspired events that led to arrests, which 
made up 31% of all documented incidents, included terrorist charges.127 This is 
compared to only 9% of far-right inspired incidents that resulted in arrests.128 
Of the incidents resulting in arrest, 91% of the Islamist inspired incidents re-
sulted in federal charges, compared to 60% of far-right inspired incidents.129 
The study also found that perpetrators of Islamist inspired attacks were pun-
ished much more severely than those who were inspired by right-wing ideolo-
gies.130 The average sentence for Islamist inspired perpetrators was twenty-one 
years, which does not include the 8% who received life sentences and the 2% 
who received death sentences.131 In the case of right-wing inspired incidents, 
the average sentence was twelve years, not counting the 12% who received life 
                                                                                                                           
noting that if Roof had espoused an Islamic extremist ideology, it would immediately have been la-
beled terrorism. Id. at 268. 
 123 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 8 (describing the difficulty of gauging the extent of terrorism 
due to the different labels and crimes used). This practice gives flexibility to prosecutors, allowing 
them to get convictions without having to convince a jury the defendant is a terrorist. Id. Despite this, 
the different labels used make it hard to determine the full extent of terrorism. Id.  
 124 See generally TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, WHO IS A TERRORIST? 
GOVERNMENT FAILURE TO DEFINE TERRORISM UNDERMINES ENFORCEMENT, PUTS CIVIL LIBERTIES 
AT RISK (2009), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/215/ [https://perma.cc/D6M2-NKNM] (de-
tailing the discrepancies in how prosecutors, the courts, and the Department of Justice label perpetra-
tors as terrorists). Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) is a data research organiza-
tion at Syracuse University. About Us, TRAC, https://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html [https://
perma.cc/CY8E-YLR9]. 
 125 Neiwert, supra note 26. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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sentences and the 5% who received the death sentence.132 A 2016 study by 
Reuters has shown similar trends.133 The study showed that over a two-year 
period twenty-seven individuals were charged for planning or carrying out at-
tacks in the name of the Islamic State.134 Those twenty-seven individuals were 
charged with crimes carrying a median sentence of fifty-three years.135 Over 
the same span of time, twenty-seven individuals were charged with similar 
actions, but inspired by U.S.-based ideologies.136 The charges faced by those 
individuals carried a median sentence of twenty years.137 
E. Politicization of Terrorism 
The most accepted definitions of terrorism do not differentiate Islamic ex-
tremists inspired by foreign groups, on the one hand, and those who espouse 
what the FBI and DHS consider to be a homegrown ideology, on the other.138 
Despite this, in the United States, politics and public opinion of who a terrorist 
is make such a differentiation.139 Even with the rise in right-wing terrorism in 
the United States, the focus is largely still on foreign Islamic extremism.140 The 
federal government does not publicly list domestic terrorists or domestic terror 
organizations in the United States.141 Due to the lack of uniformity in how do-
mestic terrorism is prosecuted, the debate of what is or is not terrorism is often 
politicized.142 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. 
 133 See Julia Edwards et al., U.S. Eyes Ways to Toughen Fight Against Domestic Extremists, REU-
TERS (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-militants-domestic-insight-idUSKCN0
VD0FG [https://perma.cc/AXT2-EA3H] (stating that the study shows “domestic terrorism suspects 
collectively have faced less severe charges than those accused of acting on behalf of the Islamic State 
since prosecutors began targeting the group in early 2014”). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See Byman, supra note 16 (stating that most definitions of terrorism do not differentiate be-
tween foreign and domestic ideologies). 
 139 See J.M. Berger, The Difference Between a Killer and a Terrorist, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/the-difference-between-killer-and-terrorist/
558998/ [https://perma.cc/GKC8-YVX4] (describing the use of the term terrorism in the United States 
and its use to describe Islamic extremists); Byman, supra note 16 (describing the “skewed perception” 
of who a terrorist is following 9/11). 
 140 Berkebile, supra note 88, at 1 (stating that despite the fact that domestic terrorism makes up 
eighty to ninety percent of attacks in the world, it is the least studied because research is concentrated 
on transnational terrorism); Reitman, supra note 14 (describing the Trump administration’s resistance 
to addressing domestic terrorism).  
 141 BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 5. 
 142 See Daniel L. Byman, Should We Treat Domestic Terrorists the Same Way We Treat ISIS?, 
BROOKINGS (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-we-treat-domestic-terrorists-
the-way-we-treat-isis-what-works-and-what-doesnt/ [https://perma.cc/W3RW-NBZG] (stating that 
political baggage associated with terrorism in the United States makes it harder to use the label when 
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Studies have shown that public perception, as well as media portrayals, 
have led Americans to associate terrorism with Islamic extremism, increasing 
negative attitudes towards Muslims.143 Some conservative news outlets are 
opposed to casting right-wing extremism in the same light as Islamic extrem-
ism and have voiced opposition to classifying those cases as domestic terror-
ism.144 The practice of casting Islamic extremist attacks and attacks inspired by 
other ideologies differently is not limited to conservative news outlets, as me-
                                                                                                                           
talking about domestic groups); Daryl Johnson, I Warned of Right-Wing Violence in 2009. Republi-
cans Objected. I Was Right., WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/08/21/i-warned-of-right-wing-violence-in-2009-it-caused-an-uproar-i-was-
right [https://perma.cc/TG4D-SHM7] (describing the practice of side-stepping or rationalizing right-
wing terrorism to avoid political backlash); Obeidallah, supra note 21 (claiming Republicans do not 
want to address right-wing extremism for fear of angering their base). 
 143 Beydoun, supra note 103, at 190 (stating that Afghan and Muslim identities are tied to terror-
ism in the United States); Yolanda Rondon, Treatment of Domestic Terrorism Cases: Class and Men-
tal Health in the Criminal System, 26 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 741, 742 (2018) (stating 
that public portrayals and perceptions have fueled Islamophobia and xenophobia). Although mass 
shootings are portrayed by the media, many smaller attacks do not generate the same attention. David 
French, It’s Time to Declare War on White Nationalist Terrorism, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2019/08/declare-war-on-white-nationalist-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/ASP6-
X6UD] (stating that “[m]ost Americans remember the Tree of Life synagogue massacre in Pitts-
burgh,” but “do you remember the white supremacist who killed a black man in New York with a 
sword,” or “the attempted church massacre in Kentucky,” or when “a member of an ‘alt-Reich’ Face-
book group stabbed a black Maryland college student to death without provocation,” “or that a white 
man in Kansas shouted ethnic slurs before shooting two Indian engineers in a bar,” and stating “sub-
stitute ‘jihadist’ for ‘white supremacist’ or ‘white nationalist’ and then imagine how we’d act”).  
 144 See David Harsanyi, The Washington Post Claims There’s a ‘Surge’ in Right-Wing Violence. 
There Isn’t, THE FEDERALIST (Nov. 26, 2018), http://thefederalist.com/2018/11/26/washington-post-
claims-theres-surge-right-wing-violence-isnt/ [https://perma.cc/FNJ7-XY9S] (taking issue with the 
classification of certain right-wing actions as domestic terrorism); Michael Edison Hayden, Tucker 
Carlson Claims That ‘Terrorism Is a Largely Immigrant Phenomena’; That’s Highly Misleading, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/tucker-carlson-claim-immigrants-cause-
terrorism-misleading-900908 [https://perma.cc/2WBC-2A8P] (describing a segment Tucker Carlson 
did on Fox News stating that terrorism is largely a problem in the immigrant community); John R. 
Lott Jr., The Media Misses the Motive, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2018/nov/7/ascribing-recent-violent-attacks-to-a-political-or/ [https://perma.cc/R42F-E6AG] 
(criticizing the media for seeing political rhetoric as influencing a large number of attacks and claiming 
right-wing individuals do not carry out a large number of terror attacks). But see Max Boot, Why Won’t 
Trump Use the ‘T’ Word to Describe Charlottesville?, WKLY. STANDARD (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.
weeklystandard.com/max-boot/why-wont-trump-use-the-t-word-to-describe-charlottesville [https://
perma.cc/AA5E-DQN9] (noting the threat of Islamic extremist terror is the greatest terror threat in the 
world but that does not mean one can ignore the rising threat of right-wing terror in the United States); 
French, supra note 143 (“Every wave of terrorism is dangerous, but waves of racist terror are particu-
larly dangerous in a nation that once tore itself to bloody shreds in large part due to its repugnant 
white supremacism.”); Andrew C. McCarthy, Let Virginia Prosecute the Charlottesville Terrorism, 
NAT’L REV. (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/charlottesville-terrorist-attack-
virginia-should-prosecute-not-feds/ [https://perma.cc/452T-DXTM] (stating that asking whether the 
Charlottesville right-wing car attack is terrorism is “akin to asking whether the sky is blue,” but argu-
ing it should be left to the state to prosecute). 
2020] Prosecuting Domestic Terrorism 365 
dia outlets across the political spectrum have provided more coverage to Islam-
ic extremist attacks.145 
A reluctance to classify right-wing attacks as terrorism is shared by some 
politicians on the right who fear right-wing ideology being criminalized.146 
Right-wing extremists also invoke political tensions because they often support 
causes many Americans believe in, even though the vast majority of Ameri-
cans who share the ideology would never resort to violence.147 This lack of 
objectivity can be shown at the highest levels of government, as shown by the 
disproportionate reactions of President Trump when the perpetrator carries out 
an attack in the name of Islamic extremism rather than right-wing ideolo-
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Murtaza Hussain, Muslims Accused of Plotting Violence Get Seven Times More Media 
Attention and Four Times Longer Sentences, INTERCEPT (Apr. 5, 2018), https://theintercept.com/
2018/04/05/muslims-violence-media-attention-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/995F-7HS4] (describing 
the results of a study conducted by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding). A study by the 
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding looked at coverage by the New York Times and Wash-
ington Post between 2002 and 2015 of ideologically motivated violence, revealing unsuccessful at-
tacks by Muslims received an average of 770% more coverage then unsuccessful ideologically moti-
vated attacks by non-Muslims. Id. Successful ideologically motivated attacks by Muslims received 
double the coverage of ideologically motivated attacks by non-Muslims. Id. The study also found that 
the Department of Justice was six times more likely to put out a press release about unsuccessful ideo-
logically motivated attacks by Muslims than by non-Muslims. Id. Another study, conducted by re-
searchers at the University of Alabama and Georgia State University, showed that the religion of the 
attacker is the best predictor of media coverage of terrorist attacks and Muslim attackers received an 
average of 357% more coverage then non-Muslim attackers. See Erin M. Kearns et al., Why Do Some 
Terrorist Attacks Receive More Media Attention Than Others?, JUST. Q. 1, 8–14 (2019) (describing 
the methodology and the results of the study). 
 146 See DHS’ Domestic Terror Warning Agers GOP, CBS NEWS (Apr. 16, 2009), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/dhs-domestic-terror-warning-angers-gop/ [https://perma.cc/PS45-45L5] (describ-
ing Republican outrage at a Homeland Security intelligence assessment that warned against right-wing 
extremism, especially in the veteran community). Not everyone on the right shares this reluctance to 
classify right-wing attacks as domestic terrorism. See BOB WOODWARD, FEAR 239 (2018) (describing 
Republican responses to the Charlottesville attack). Following the Charlottesville attack, Republican 
senator Cory Gardner tweeted “Mr. President – we must call evil by its name. These were white su-
premacists and this was domestic terrorism.” Id. Republican senator Marco Rubio tweeted “Very 
important for the nation to hear @potus describe events in #Charlottesville for what they are, a terror 
attack by #whitesupremacists.” Id. Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan tweeted “White su-
premacy is a scourge. This hate and its terrorism must be confronted and defeated.” Id. After the El 
Paso shooting, George P. Bush, Republican Texas Land Commissioner and son of notable Republican 
Jeb Bush, wrote an op-ed in The Atlantic, where he wrote “terrorism by white supremacists is indeed 
a real and present danger” and “Conservatives have not been afraid to confront extremism in our 
world, and we must not be afraid to confront terrorism here at home: anywhere, anytime, and in any 
form.” George P. Bush, White-Nationalist Terrorism Must Be Stopped, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/white-terrorism-must-be-stopped/595471/ [https://
perma.cc/T76B-M94N]. Conservative writer David French stated addressing right-wing extremism 
does not require “surrendering a single rational, good-faith argument about proper levels of immigra-
tion” and “fighting for your political values does not ever require you to abandon decency and re-
spect.” French, supra note 143.  
 147 Byman, supra note 142. Fifteen percent of Americans support the idea that abortion should be 
illegal no matter the circumstance, but the overwhelming majority would not resort to the violence 
others have to support that cause. Id. 
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gies.148 The Trump administration has found political support in many individ-
uals and groups with right-wing extremist views.149 President Trump has been 
accused of not condemning right-wing terrorist attacks as harshly as Islamic 
extremist attacks to appease these supporters.150 The failure to recognize do-
                                                                                                                           
 148 See Maggie Haberman & Michael D. Shear, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on Char-
lottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html [https://perma.cc/4992-RL8A] (summa-
rizing President Trump’s response to the Charlottesville protest and attack, where he stated there was 
“blame on both sides” for the violence); Alex Wagner, Trump’s Selective Responses to Terror, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jun. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/trumps-selective-
responses-to-terror/529218/ [https://perma.cc/LDL5-M2JC] (comparing the quick and powerful re-
sponses of President Trump to Islamist inspired attacks, and his silence, delay, and reluctance follow-
ing attacks carried out in the name of right-wing ideologies). 
 149 See J.M. Berger, How White Nationalists Learned to Love Donald Trump, POLITICO (Oct. 25, 
2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/10/donald-trump-2016-white-nationalists-alt-
right-214388 [https://perma.cc/YW74-HA9K] (describing Neo-Nazi and KKK support for President 
Trump’s 2016 campaign); French, supra note 143 (“Alt-right support for Trump wasn’t random. It 
wasn’t arbitrary. It was directly related to his rhetoric, and it was cultivated by his allies, and it was 
cultivated in part because it was a new way to fight, to punch back against the hated Left.”); Kevin 
Roose & Ali Winston, Far-Right Internet Groups Listen for Trump’s Approval, and Often Hear It, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/far-right-internet-trump.
html [https://perma.cc/R63T-HCFF] (describing right-wing online forums supporting President 
Trump’s rhetoric). A commenter on the white nationalist site Stormfront called President Trump’s 
avoidance of the question of whether he would repudiate the endorsement from David Duke, head of 
the KKK, as “the best political thing I have seen in my life.” Berger, supra. These groups saw many 
of President Trump’s actions during the campaign, such as retweeting a tweet from an account with 
the username @whitegenocideTM, as nods to their ideologies, even as he would publicly apologize 
for them later. Id. 
 150 See J.M. Berger, A Dangerous New Americanism?, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/a-dangerous-new-americanism/ [https://perma.cc/LS8D-JFDS] 
(claiming President Trump and his “movement” are “steering America into the death spiral that leads 
to true violent extremism” as he works against “out-groups” such as Muslims). Steve Bannon, who 
leads Breitbart news and claimed he wanted it to become the “platform for the alt-right,” worked as a 
chief strategist in the Trump White House. See Joseph Bernstein, Alt-White: How the Breitbart Ma-
chine Laundered Racist Hate, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/josephbernstein/heres-how-breitbart-and-milo-smuggled-white-nationalism#.inq1rVA0D 
[https://perma.cc/57AG-VGTM] (publishing documents and emails that detail the inner workings of 
Breitbart and Steve Bannon). Prior to the 2016 election, Breitbart adopted a “no enemies on the right 
policy.” See Tina Nguyen, Steve Bannon Has a Nazi Problem, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 12, 2016), https://
www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/09/steve-bannon-has-a-nazi-problem [https://perma.cc/FE4S-UX3N] 
(describing the relationship between Steve Bannon and the far right). Bannon was ousted from the 
White House soon after Charlottesville. Id. Associates of Bannon state that he believes open associa-
tion with racists is a threat to his desire for “populist nationalism,” but the issue is removing them 
from the movement. See id. (quoting Steve Bannon as angrily asking “What the fuck do we do about 
the Nazis?”). There are members of the Trump Administration who have taken issue with the Presi-
dent’s response to right-wing attacks, including former economic advisor Gary Cohen, who attempted 
to resign following the President’s response to Charlottesville. See WOODWARD, supra note 146, at 
249 (describing the attempted resignation of Cohen and President Trump’s hostility to his concerns). 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions referred to the Charlottesville attack as an evil act of domestic terror-
ism. See Rebecca R. Ruiz & Charlie Savage, Sessions Emerges as Forceful Figure in Condemning 
Charlottesville Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/
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mestic terrorism for what it is, however, is not a problem unique to the Trump 
administration, as the Obama administration did not characterize Dylann Roof 
as a domestic terrorist when he attacked a church in South Carolina in order to 
start a race war.151 
This lack of an objective standard has real world consequences, as shown 
by conservative outrage at a 2009 Department of Homeland Security Report 
that warned of a rise in right-wing extremism.152 John Boehner, then-Minority 
Leader of the House, criticized the Department for using the same words used 
to describe al-Qaeda to describe Americans who have different opinions than 
the government.153 Despite the accuracy of the report, there was enough out-
rage for the Department of Homeland Security Secretary to renounce the re-
port’s findings.154 The unit that wrote the report was dissolved, and by 2010, 
there were no analysts at the Department of Homeland Security working on 
threats posed by domestic terrorism.155 In 2011, the House Homeland Security 
Committee held hearings on domestic terrorism that focused solely on threats 
relating to al-Qaeda.156 The Trump administration has made cuts to programs 
aimed at combating right-wing extremism.157 There have also been accusations 
                                                                                                                           
politics/domestic-terrorism-sessions.html [https://perma.cc/F4EP-X9UX] (describing Jeff Sessions’s 
response to the Charlottesville attack). 
 151 See Norris, supra note 24, at 265–68 (describing the responses of members of the Obama 
administration to the Charleston shooting). FBI Director James Comey did not shut down the idea of 
calling it terrorism but hesitated; a month after the attack he replied he did not yet know if it was ter-
rorism. Id. at 265. Attorney General Loretta Lynch did not immediately label the act as terrorism ei-
ther. Id. at 266. 
 152 S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 17, at 12, 14–15 (describing the outrage following the 
release of a DHS report titled “Right-Wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fuel-
ing Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment”). The Report warned of a possible rise in right-
wing extremism due to the economic downturn at the time and the recent election of President Obama. 
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 3–4 (describing the factors that could lead 
to a rise in right-wing extremism). The Report singled out “disgruntled military veterans” as a group 
that could be exceptionally dangerous, though it noted the trend from the 1990s that was present when 
the report was released only involved a small percentage of veterans who were willing to join extrem-
ist groups. Id. at 7. 
 153 S. POVERTY LAW CTR., supra note 17, at 14–15 (quoting House Minority Leader John 
Boehner as stating the same words used to describe al-Qaeda should not be used to describe “Ameri-
can citizens who disagree with the direction Washington Democrats are taking our nation”). 
 154 Id. at 12–13 (describing DHS’s response to the outrage over the report). 
 155 Johnson, supra note 142. 
 156 Neiwert, supra note 26 (quoting Representative Peter King, who was the chairman of the 
House Homeland Security Committee, as saying, “[t]his committee cannot live in denial, which is 
what some would have us do when they suggest that this hearing dilute its focus by investigating 
threats unrelated to Al Qaeda”). 
 157 Peter Beinart, Trump Shut Programs to Counter Violent Extremism, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/trump-shut-countering-violent-extremism-
program/574237/ [https://perma.cc/T4VR-4U4M] (detailing the cancellation of grants to groups fo-
cused on combating right-wing extremism and the gutting of the Office of Community Partnerships). 
One of the grants went to the group Life After Hate, a group that helped people leave white suprema-
cy groups. Id. The other grant went to University of North Carolina researchers who were helping 
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that the Trump administration defunded the Global Terrorism Database be-
cause the data showed a rise in right-wing attacks.158 The National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism almost exclusively focuses on the threats posed by “radical 
Islamist terrorist groups,” and dedicates more time discussing the threat posed by 
European separatist movements than it does domestic terrorism.159 Programs 
intended to counter extremism have largely focused on Muslims despite the rise 
in right-wing extremism.160 The politicization of who is considered a terrorist 
has extended to the Trump Administration’s attempt to vilify people on the left 
who embrace violence, while ignoring those on the right.161 A major problem 
                                                                                                                           
young people create media campaigns to discourage other young people from adhering to white su-
premacy and other radical ideologies. Id. The grants were administered by the Office of Community 
Partnerships, which aimed to work with communities to prevent people from embracing Islamic ex-
tremism and white supremacist ideologies. Id. The administration cut the Office’s budget by more 
than $18 million, cut the number of its full-time employees in half, and renamed it the Office of Ter-
rorism Prevention Partnerships. Id.  
 158 Emily Atkin, A Database Showed Right-Wing Terror on the Rise. Then Trump Defunded It., 
NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 3, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/152675/database-showed-far-right-
terror-rise-trump-defunded-it [https://perma.cc/VPF4-CENP] (describing the Global Terrorism Data-
base and the data it showed and raising the possibility that it was defunded because of the administra-
tion’s hostility to its findings). 
 159 See DONALD J. TRUMP, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, at I (2018) (stating 
the main terroristic threat faced by the nation today is radical Islamic terrorist groups and groups affil-
iated with Iran). In a section of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism titled “The Terrorist Ad-
versary,” the focus is mostly on “radical Islamist terrorists.” Id. at 7–9. Ten paragraphs are dedicated 
to the threat posed by “radical Islamist” groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, one paragraph is dedicated 
to overseas separatist movements, and the last paragraph recognizes the threat from domestic terrorists 
motivated by extremism that is not radical Islamist. Id. at 7–10.  
 160 Ahmed, supra note 69, at 1561. 
 161 Mike Baker & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Antifa and Far-Right Groups Face off in Portland 
as Trump Weighs in, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/17/us/portland-
oregon-protests.html [https://perma.cc/LTF9-HJAQ] (showing the response of President Trump to 
2019 clashes between anti-fascist group “Antifa” and far-right group “the Proud Boys” in Oregon). 
President Trump has publicly considered labeling Antifa an “organization of terror.” See Donald 
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 17, 2019, 7:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonald
Trump/status/1162726857231544320 [https://perma.cc/X8H4-RJTN] (“Major consideration is being 
given to naming ANTIFA an “ORGANIZATION OF TERROR.” Portland is being watched very 
closely. Hopefully the Mayor will be able to properly do his job!”). President Trump did not mention 
the right-wing groups present at the time in Portland. Baker & Bogel-Burroughs, supra. Republican 
Senators Bill Cassidy of Louisiana and Ted Cruz of Texas have introduced a resolution to designate 
Antifa a domestic terrorist organization. Id. The resolution states that the Senate: 
(1) calls for the groups across the country who act under the banner of Antifa to be des-
ignated as domestic terrorist organizations; (2) unequivocally condemns the violent ac-
tions of Antifa groups as unacceptable acts for anyone in the United States; (3) express-
es the need for the peaceful communication of varied ideas in the United States; (4) 
urges any group or organizations in the United States to voice its opinions without us-
ing violence or threatening the health, safety, or well-being of any other persons, 
groups, or law enforcement officers in the United States; [and] (5) calls upon the Feder-
al Government to redouble its efforts, using all available and appropriate tools, to combat 
the spread of all forms of domestic terrorism, including White supremacist terrorism. 
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with prosecuting domestic terrorists as terrorists is the inability of federal pros-
ecutors to persuade juries that an individual with no affiliation to a foreign ter-
rorist organization is a terrorist.162 Additionally, prosecutors may refrain from 
labeling a defendant a terrorist when charging him with general criminal stat-
utes because the defendant may claim the term is not supported by the charges 
he is facing and is unfairly prejudicial.163 
II. SIMILAR ACTS, BUT DIFFERENT CRIMES 
Part II of this Note shows why a federal statute criminalizing domestic 
terrorism is needed to capture all individuals who fit within the definition pro-
vided in the terrorism chapter of the criminal code.164 Section A looks at the 
gaps in the current law and why people who fit the Patriot Act’s definition of 
domestic terrorism are not prosecuted as terrorists.165 Sections B through D 
look at high-profile cases of attacks that fit within the Patriot Act’s definition 
of domestic terrorism, and how they were prosecuted.166 Section B examines 
the attack carried out by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev at the 2013 Boston Marathon, the 
response to it, and his prosecution under the applicable statutes in the terrorist 
chapter of the criminal code.167 Section C looks at Michael Taylor Wilson and 
his attempted attack on an Amtrak Train in 2017, the reaction to it, and why he 
was charged as a terrorist.168 Section D looks at the 2015 attack carried out by 
Dylann Roof in Charleston, South Carolina, the response to it, and the gov-
ernment’s inability to charge him as a terrorist.169 Section E compares the simi-
larities between these attacks despite their different treatment by the govern-
ment.170 
                                                                                                                           
Cassidy, Cruz: Antifa Is a Domestic Terrorism Organization, BILL CASSIDY, M.D. (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.cassidy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cassidy-cruz-antifa-is-a-domestic-terrorist-
organization [https://perma.cc/JWA8-QWPE]. Antifa has engaged in violent acts but are responsible 
for zero deaths. Garrett Epps, The Proud Boys’ Real Target, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2019), https://
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/meaning-street-protests-portland/596686/ [https://perma.
cc/FNJ9-2DFB] (describing Antifa actions including beating up a conservative journalist, throwing 
milkshakes, threatening violence, and fighting at right-wing rallies). 
 162 Daryl Johnson, Congressional Report Highlights Gaps in U.S. Domestic Terrorism Policy, 
SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/01/02/
congressional-report-highlights-gaps-us-domestic-terrorism-policy [https://perma.cc/Q2RK-GE6W] 
(quoting “current and formal federal prosecutors” stating it is hard to “convince a jury that someone 
who is not affiliated with a foreign group can be guilty of terrorism”).  
 163 McCord, supra note 13 (describing the risks prosecutors would take in labeling a defendant a 
terrorist but not charging terroristic crimes). 
 164 See infra notes 164–244 and accompanying text. 
 165 See infra notes 171–192 and accompanying text. 
 166 See infra notes 193–225 and accompanying text. 
 167 See infra notes 193–207 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 208–218 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 219–225 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 226–244 and accompanying text. 
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A. Gaps in the Law 
As discussed in Part I, there are numerous laws that address terrorism in 
the United States.171 Despite this, there are acts that fit within the Patriot Act’s 
definition of domestic terrorism that cannot be prosecuted as terrorism.172 The 
lack of applicable statutes to non-Islamic extremists may be one reason for the 
disproportionate treatment of Muslims as terrorists.173 Section 2339B, crimi-
nalizing support to a foreign terrorist organization, has been interpreted very 
broadly to cover individuals in the United States who support foreign terrorist 
organizations.174 Attacks inspired by Islamic extremist ideology are considered 
international because they are inspired by the ideology of foreign terrorist or-
ganizations.175 Many of the Islamic inspired attacks in the United States are 
prosecuted using the provision outlawing “material support” for a “foreign ter-
rorist” organization.176 For an individual inspired by a domestic ideology to be 
prosecuted with a material support statute, one of the enumerated crimes must 
have been committed.177 Only two incidents that were not inspired by Islamic 
ideology have been prosecuted under Section 2339A since its enactment.178 
                                                                                                                           
 171 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2012). 
 172 See Norris, supra note 24, at 278 (explaining why Roof was not charged with terrorism fol-
lowing his ideologically motivated attack in South Carolina). 
 173 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 1 (stating that a large number of individuals who are con-
sidered domestic terrorists do not engage in the typical tactics that are covered in the terrorism chapter 
of the criminal code). 
 174 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; see GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 4 (noting the treatment of 
Islamists as international terrorists if they consume propaganda of a foreign terrorist organization); 
Daddario & Jenkins, supra note 26 (noting the broad use of the material support statutes). In 2018, 
Alexander Ciccolo of Adams, Massachusetts was charged and pled guilty to § 2339B, in addition to 
other charges. See Massachusetts Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges, DEP’T JUST. (May 21, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/massachusetts-man-pleads-guilty-terrorism-charges [https://
perma.cc/EZ8X-Q62P] (describing the actions and plea of Alexander Ciccolo). Ciccolo pledged alle-
giance to ISIS and had a plan to carry out an attack in the United States in their name. Id. Ciccolo had 
conversations with a cooperating witness about the plan and the influence ISIS ideology had on him, 
but there was no mention of any contact with the organization. See Government’s Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motion to Detain Alexander Ciccolo at 2–7, United States v. Ciccolo, 2015 WL 
9294206 (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2015) (Crim. No. 15-mj-3054-KAR) (detailing the contacts Ciccolo had 
with the FBI’s cooperating witnesses). The FBI Special Agent in Charge said, “Alexander Ciccolo 
was a committed solider of ISIS.” Sasha Ingber, Boston Police Captain’s Son Sentenced to 20 Years 
for Terrorist Plot, NPR (Sep. 5, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/05/644957277/boston-police-
captains-son-sentenced-to-20-years-for-terror-plot [https://perma.cc/UW9U-8LP3]. 
 175 Daddario & Jenkins, supra note 26 (noting the use of the material support statute to prosecute 
those inspired by foreign terrorist organizations). 
 176 Id. 
 177 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (listing the crimes that constitute terrorism for purposes of the statute); 
Ahmed, supra note 69, at 1560 (stating that a Muslim accused of violating § 2339B for providing 
support to a group like ISIS can be prosecuted for actions that would not violate federal law if they 
were done to support a domestic group such as the KKK). 
 178 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; Edwards et al., supra note 133 (noting the lack of prosecutions under the 
material support statute for individuals espousing domestic ideologies). In 1996 a militia gathered 
explosives as part of a plot to attack the FBI building. GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 8 
2020] Prosecuting Domestic Terrorism 371 
There is no material support statute for domestic terror organizations like there 
is for foreign terror organizations.179 Furthermore, there is no list of domestic 
terror organizations like there is for foreign terrorist organizations, and many 
of the domestic groups that inspire domestic terror attacks engage in Constitu-
tionally protected free speech.180 Similar to the material support statutes, Sec-
tion 2339, which criminalizes harboring terrorists, only applies to individuals 
that harbor or conceal someone who has or is about to commit one of the acts 
covered by the enumerated statutes listed.181 
The treatment of individuals inspired by Islamic extremism as supporting 
foreign organizations is consistent with the FBI and Department of Homeland 
Security view that domestic terrorists do not get inspiration from foreign 
groups.182 The effect of this policy is to define domestic terrorism as only be-
ing events inspired by certain ideologies, without considering the nationality of 
the perpetrator.183 That said, many of the ideologies considered to be domestic, 
                                                                                                                           
(describing the instances where individuals espousing domestic ideologies were charged with material 
support). Two of the men involved were charged with violating § 2339A, one of whom pled guilty to 
the charge. Id. at 8–9. In 2012, a KKK member built and tested a radiation device to use against Mus-
lims with the assistance of another individual. Id. at 9. Both were charged with violating § 2339A. Id. 
One of the men was found guilty of other charges while the other pled guilty to § 2339A. Id. 
 179 Edwards et al., supra note 133. 
 180 See Margaret K. Lewis, When Foreign Is Criminal, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 625, 671 (2015) (stating 
that the lack of a clear definition of domestic terrorist organization makes it harder to define what a 
foreign terrorist organization is for the purposes of the material support statutes); Byman, supra note 
142 (describing the free speech issue with treating domestic terrorists the same as international terror-
ists). The United States Constitution protects the exercise of free speech and the right of assembly. See 
U.S. CONST. amend I. This protection extends to the ideologies that inspire terrorist attacks, including 
that of the Charlottesville protests. See ACLU Statement on Charlottesville Violence and Demonstra-
tions, ACLU (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-statement-charlottesville-violence-and-
demonstrations [https://perma.cc/S5S6-5WD3] (explaining that the First Amendment protects “vile, 
hateful, and ignorant speech,” and justifying the decision of the American Civil Liberty Union 
(ACLU) to defend the Unite the Right protesters’ right to march prior to the protests). Due to these 
protections, the United States does not have the same tools as other countries, such as Germany, to 
combat ideologies. See Claire G. Gastañaga, Why We Can’t Support HB 1601, Domestic Terrorism 
Legislation, ACLU VA. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://acluva.org/en/news/why-we-cant-support-hb-1601-
domestic-terrorism-legislation [https://perma.cc/YTT3-G9CY] (stating that the ACLU cannot support 
a bill criminalizing domestic terrorism in Virginia due to free speech concerns); Germany Is Silencing 
“Hate Speech,” but Cannot Define It, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.economist.com/
europe/2018/01/13/germany-is-silencing-hate-speech-but-cannot-define-it [https://perma.cc/A52A-
636K] (discussing anti-hate speech laws in Germany including bans on the Swastika and Mein Kempf 
in unannotated form, as well as the criticism of the policies and troubles the government has faced in 
accurately defining what constitutes “hate speech”). 
 181 18 U.S.C. § 2339. 
 182 See BJELOPERA, supra note 25, at 4 (stating the definition of domestic terrorism used by the 
FBI and DHS). 
 183 See GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 3 (describing the effect of the government’s 
classification of domestic terrorism). 
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such as white supremacy, have international inspirations or affiliations.184 
Many international groups with shared ideologies as “U.S. based ideologies,” 
however, are not designated as international terrorist organizations by the 
United States government, making the material support statute used in the fight 
against Islamic extremism inapplicable.185 
The remaining crimes in Chapter 113B relate to specific actions.186 This 
leaves individuals who would be considered terrorists under the Patriot Act’s 
definition of domestic terrorism as outside the reach of the terrorism section of 
the criminal code.187 Additionally, the statutes relating to specific actions do 
not have a requirement that the perpetrator intended to influence the govern-
                                                                                                                           
 184 See id. (describing the international influences of domestic ideologies); Lewis, supra note 180, 
at 672 (questioning whether American groups that get inspiration from foreign group would be con-
sidered foreign or domestic for the purposes of the material support statute). An example of interna-
tional inspiration is the fact that the Neo-Nazi movement has drawn from the Nazi movement in Ger-
many. GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 3. Similarly, the Earth Liberation Front was founded 
in the United Kingdom in 1992. Bruce Barcott, From Tree-Hugger to Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/07/magazine/from-tree-hugger-to-terrorist.html [https://
perma.cc/2YSC-TZWT] (describing the origins of the Earth Liberation Front). More recently, domes-
tic white supremacists have been heavily influenced by Breivik, who published an almost 1,600-page 
manifesto titled “2083: A European Declaration of Independence” prior to setting off a truck bomb in 
Oslo and attacking a youth political camp, killing seventy-seven people. Berger, supra note 117. 
Christopher Hasson, a member of the U.S. Coast Guard arrested for plotting an attack on public liberal 
figures, closely followed instructions in Breivik’s manifesto, including his use of human growth hor-
mones. See Motion for Detention Pending Trial at 6–13, United States v. Hasson, 2019 WL 4573424 
(D. Md. Sept. 20, 2019) (No. GLS-19-63) (detailing Breivik’s influence on Hasson). Hasson is just the 
most recent American to be inspired by Breivik; J.M. Berger, a fellow at the International Center for 
Counterterrorism at the Hague, has stated that Breivik has “acquired iconic status on the far right.” See 
Berger, supra note 117. Alex Linder, American Neo-Nazi and owner of the far-right forum VNN, has 
said Breivik is a model to follow, stating “I believe the time for violence is here: Anders Breivik fired 
the starting gun for the Age of Killing the Enemy.” Id. On right-wing forums, Anders Breivik is usual-
ly mentioned alongside Dylann Roof as a role-model. Id. 
 185 See GERMAN & ROBINSON, supra note 26, at 3–4 (stating that many of the international 
groups that share ideologies considered by the Department of Justice to be domestic are not listed as 
foreign terrorist organizations). An example of this influence is Blood and Honour, a racist skinhead 
group based in the United Kingdom that advocates a race war and has American affiliates. Blood & 
Honour, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/
blood-honour [https://perma.cc/VXA5-VA78] (describing Blood and Honour in the United States). 
The group is not designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. See Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, supra note 82. 
 186 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (detailing terrorism statutes punishing specific ac-
tions such as using nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and the bombing of government 
buildings). 
 187 See Norris, supra note 24, at 278 (noting that Roof falls under the Patriot Act’s definition of 
terrorism but it cannot be prosecuted as such); Greg Myre, Why the Government Can’t Bring Terror-
ism Charges in Charlottesville, NPR (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/14/543462676/
why-the-govt-cant-bring-terrorism-charges-in-charlottesville [https://perma.cc/7876-AC5R] (quoting 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions as stating that the actions of James Alex Fields Jr. in Charlottesville 
meet the statutory definition of domestic terrorism and pointing out he cannot be charged with domes-
tic terrorism). 
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ment or a civilian population.188 Unlike these statutes, the definition of domes-
tic terrorism in the Patriot Act requires that the action is intended to influence 
the population or government.189 This allows for situations where an individual 
is convicted under the terrorism chapter of the criminal code for an action that 
does not fit the government’s own definition of terrorism.190 
The sentencing enhancements for terrorism have been criticized because 
Muslims have faced tougher sentences when charged with terrorism.191 The 
terrorism enhancement does not differentiate between religion, race, ethnicity, 
or ideology, but Muslims are disproportionately affected.192 
B. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 
In April 2013, two bombs were set off at the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon.193 The explosives were placed there by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, two brothers who legally immigrated from Chechnya to 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.194 Dzhokhar was the only brother to survive the 
manhunt that ensued.195 Before he was apprehended while hiding under a boat 
in Watertown, Massachusetts, he wrote a message on the wall of the boat that 
denounced U.S. policy towards the Middle East.196 In addition to this, the 
brothers learned how to make the bombs from the online magazine of al-
Qaeda.197 
Tsarnaev was charged under two statutes from the terrorism chapter of the 
criminal code: Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction and Bombing of a Place 
                                                                                                                           
 188 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (omitting such an intent requirement); id. § 2332A (same); id. § 2332F 
(same); id. § 2332G (2012) (same); id. § 2332H (2012) (same); id. § 2332I (same). 
 189 See id. § 2331(5) (defining the intent requirement for domestic terrorism). 
 190 See United States v. Reynolds, 381 F.3d 404, 404 (5th Cir. 2004) (convicting defendant of 18 
U.S.C. § 2332A after he told a customer service representative that he put anthrax in the company’s 
air conditioning because he was angry with the company). 
 191 Rondon, supra note 143, at 784 (stating that there are worries Muslims and Muslim Arabs face 
tougher sentences for terror related crimes). 
 192 See Ahmed, supra note 69, at 1534 (stating that Muslims are disproportionately affected by 
the terrorism enhancement much like African Americans are disproportionately affected by the sen-
tencing laws promulgated in the war on drugs). 
 193 Michael Cooper & John Eligon, Blasts at Boston Marathon Kill 3 and Injure 100, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/us/explosions-reported-at-site-of-boston-marathon.
html [https://perma.cc/2SL9-ZZ85]. 
 194 Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/
2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/455V-382R]. 
 195 Id. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed in a shootout with police. Id. 
 196 Indictment at 4, United States v. Tsarnaev, 53 F. Supp. 3d 450 (D. Mass. June 27, 2013) (13-
10200-GAO). The messages on the inside of the boat were: “The U.S. government is killing our inno-
cent civilians”; “I can’t stand to see so much evil go unpunished”; “We Muslims are one body, you 
hurt one you hurt us all”; “Now I don’t like killing innocent people it is forbidden in Islam but due to 
said [unintelligible] it is allowed”; and “Stop killing our innocent people and we will stop.” Id. 
 197 Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 686 (2017). 
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of Public Use.198 In the indictment, the government wrote that Tsarnaev had 
various items of Islamic extremist propaganda on his computer, in furtherance 
of the conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction.199 There were two non-
statutory aggravating factors related to terrorism for the jury to consider when 
weighing whether or not to sentence him to death.200 The jury had to determine 
whether he (1) made statements that promoted terrorism against the United 
States, and (2) targeted a large, “iconic event” that was vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks.201 Tsarnaev is the first terrorist to receive a death sentence from a fed-
eral jury since 9/11.202 
The actions of the Tsarnaev brothers fit within the Patriot Act’s definition 
of domestic terrorism because the actions were dangerous to human life and 
can be considered intended to influence government policy or affect the con-
duct of the government through mass destruction.203 Despite fitting into the 
definition of domestic terrorism in the Patriot Act and being an American citi-
zen, Tsarnaev would not qualify as a domestic terrorist under FBI and Home-
land Security definitions because he was acting on behalf of a foreign ideolo-
gy.204 Tsarnaev was prosecuted as a terrorist because his acts fit with those 
covered by the terrorism chapter of the criminal code.205 Tsarnaev was not 
charged with material support to a foreign terrorist organization, despite the al-
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Indictment, supra note 196, at 1 (listing the charges); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332A, F. He 
was also charged with Malicious Destruction of Property, Use of a Firearm During and in Relation to 
a Crime of Violence, Use of a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence Causing Death, 
Carjacking Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence, 
Aiding and Abetting, and Forfeiture. Indictment, supra note 196, at 1. 
 199 See Indictment, supra note 196, at 6–7 (listing the propaganda downloaded to his computer). 
According to the indictment, Tsarnaev downloaded a copy of “The Slicing Sword, Against the One 
Who Forms Allegiances with Disbelievers and Takes Them as Supporters Instead of Allah, His Mes-
senger and the Believers,” which counsels Muslims not to support governments that invade Muslim 
lands, “Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation and Imam,” which promotes violence 
against supposed enemies of Islam, “Jihad and the Effects and Intention Upon It,” which calls for 
martyrdom in support of violent jihad, and volume one of “Inspire,” which contains instructions on 
how to build an IED. Id. 
 200 Penalty Phase Jury Verdict, supra note 80, at 12–13 (listing the non-statutory aggravated fac-
tors). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Katharine Q. Seelye, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Given Death Penalty in Boston Marathon Bombing, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/16/us/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-death-
sentence.html [https://perma.cc/JW6L-ZTX2]. 
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TERS (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boston-bombings-trial/boston-bomb-suspect-
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Boston Marathon and was charged with bombing of a public place and use of a weapon of mass de-
struction). 
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Qaeda literature he possessed and the willingness of prosecutors to apply the 
statute to individuals who had no direct contact with the foreign organizations 
that influenced them.206 Had Tsarnaev used a different method of attack other 
than a bomb, it is not clear if he would have been charged as a terrorist.207 
C. Taylor Michael Wilson 
In October 2017, Taylor Michael Wilson pulled the emergency brakes on 
an Amtrak train in Nebraska.208 Wilson broke into the engine room with a gun, 
where he cut the lights and disabled the train.209 He was subsequently over-
powered by the train conductors.210 During the struggle he said that he was 
“trying to save the train from black people.”211 Wilson is a member of the Na-
tional Socialist Movement, a Neo-Nazi organization, and upon searching his 
apartment authorities found a copy of Mein Kampf and a play Wilson had writ-
ten about overthrowing the American government.212 He also attended a 2017 
“Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville.213 According to his roommate, Wil-
son had recently joined an extremist group by looking at online forums.214 
Wilson pled guilty to one terroristic crime, though not in the terrorist chap-
ter of the criminal code, for carrying out a terroristic attack against railroad carri-
ers.215 The act of taking over a train is dangerous to human life and his active 
affiliations with white supremacy groups and comments on the train evidenced a 
political motivation, so Wilson’s actions seemingly fall under the Patriot Act’s 
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definition of domestic terrorism.216 Despite this connection to white supremacy, 
the statute he was charged under did not require any intent to influence a popula-
tion or government.217 Had Wilson not attacked a train or other mass transporta-
tion system, his actions would not be considered terrorism unless he committed 
one of the other acts of the terrorism chapter of the criminal code.218 
D. Dylann Roof 
In June of 2015, Dylann Roof entered Emanuel African Methodist Epis-
copal Church in Charleston, South Carolina and killed nine African-American 
churchgoers.219 Roof had posted a white supremacist manifesto online and told 
authorities he carried out the attack to provoke a race war.220 Roof adopted his 
radical ideology by consuming online materials.221 
This attack fits the definition of terrorism in the Patriot Act, as it was in-
tended to coerce a civil population by starting a race war, and involved acts 
dangerous to human life.222 Roof was not charged with terrorism due to a lack 
of statutes that applied to his method of carrying out the attack.223 Roof’s 
crimes could have led to the application of terrorism sentencing enhancements 
or aggravating factors for terrorism supporting the death penalty.224 Despite 
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this, when Roof was sentenced to death, neither the statutory aggravating fac-
tor for terrorism nor any non-statutory aggravating factors for terrorism were 
considered by the jury.225 
E. Different Treatments for Similar Crimes 
Dylann Roof and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev both carried out acts of violence 
against innocent people to further an ideology they believed in; one in the 
name of white supremacy and one in the name of Islamic extremism.226 Tsar-
naev downloaded Islamic extremist propaganda from the Internet and Roof 
became radicalized by consuming white supremacy propaganda on the Inter-
net.227 Both were sentenced to death.228 Tsarnaev was charged as a terrorist and 
Roof was not because Tsarnaev used a more traditional attack: a weapon of 
mass destruction in a public place.229 Despite the similarity of their crimes—
mass violence to further their own ideology—only Tsarnaev faced aggravating 
factors for terrorism when facing the death penalty.230 
Taylor Michael Wilson was charged with a terrorism statute, while Roof 
was not, because he targeted a train rather than a church.231 Wilson and Roof 
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both espoused white supremacist ideologies.232 They both carried out their at-
tacks with guns.233 Despite these similarities, only Wilson was charged with a 
terrorism crime because he happened to fall under one of the enumerated stat-
utes criminalizing a specific action, in his case attacking a railroad.234 
As shown by the case of Dylann Roof, there are a number of federal stat-
utes that individuals who fit the Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorist 
can be charged under, even if one of the limited chapters of the terrorism code 
does not apply.235 Although this use of other crimes allows people fitting the 
Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism to be prosecuted, it creates other 
issues.236 Terrorism has been used to refer to “the other side,” and “the bad 
guy.”237 The United States has fought a “war on terror.”238 Today, the criminal 
justice system of the United States disproportionately applies the label of ter-
rorism to individuals that espouse Islamic extremism.239 This discrepancy can 
be partially explained by the difficulty of prosecuting domestic terrorists as 
terrorists due to the requirement they commit certain acts, rather than just do-
mestic terrorism more broadly.240 This treatment has led to an increase in prej-
udice against Muslims, including a significant rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes 
since 9/11.241 The disproportionate coverage of Islamic extremist terror in the 
media as well as the harsher treatment in the court system has helped separate 
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them as a distinct class of perpetrators.242 The increase of lone wolves across 
the ideological spectrum have made terrorists increasingly similar, and both 
Islamic extremists and individuals adhering to other ideologies are often radi-
calized on the Internet.243 It is important for the federal government to prose-
cute individuals who only differ on ideology the same way, and not place a 
stigma on one segment of the population.244 
III. WHAT SHOULD A DOMESTIC TERROR STATUTE LOOK LIKE? 
A United States statute criminalizing domestic terrorism should make it 
illegal for any lawful resident of the United States to carry out an act that vio-
lates the criminal laws of the United States, or any state, with the intent to 
cause serious physical injury or death in order to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coer-
cion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassina-
tion, or kidnapping; and to carry out such crime primarily within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.245 
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The United States criminal code has a definition for domestic terrorism, 
and although it does not criminalize domestic terrorism, it is a good starting 
point for a potential domestic terrorism crime statute.246 The definition covers 
violations of the law that pose a risk to human life and have an intent to influ-
ence a population or government.247 Though the exact definition of terrorism is 
debated, this definition fits with the expert perception that terrorism is public 
violence intended to advance a certain ideology, whether it be social, religious, 
or political.248 
The current definition of domestic terrorism requires an action that vio-
lates a federal or state law and poses a danger to human life.249 There are a 
broad range of acts that are covered by the definition, and not all of them 
would fit a traditional understanding of terrorism.250 On the other hand, a stat-
ute criminalizing domestic terrorism should not be limited to certain actions 
covered in other enumerated statutes, as is the standard for Federal Crime of 
Terrorism used in 18 U.S.C. § 2332B and sentencing enhancements.251 The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has proposed a requirement that the 
acts actually result in serious harm or death instead of the broader definition of 
all acts that pose a danger to human life.252 Given the severity of the charge, a 
statute criminalizing terrorism should ensure the perpetrator intends to actually 
cause harm or death.253 An effective act criminalizing domestic terrorism 
should require that the perpetrator carries out an act that violates the criminal 
laws of the United States, or any state, with the intent to cause serious physical 
injury or death.254 
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Terrorism is ideologically motivated, so a statute criminalizing it must in-
clude such a mens rea requirement.255 The perpetrator cannot be prosecuted for 
simply holding such an ideology; the act must have been carried out to ad-
vance that ideology.256 The current definition of domestic terrorism requires 
such an intent.257 The current intent requirement is important because it does 
not differentiate between ideologies; as long as the act is carried out with the 
stated purpose of influencing a government or civilian population, the re-
quirement is satisfied.258 This is different than the FBI and DHS requirement 
that domestic terrorism be influenced by “domestic ideologies.”259 This will 
ensure Americans radicalized on the Internet, with no direct connection to a 
terrorist organization, will be prosecuted the same way, no matter the ideology 
they adhere to.260 This will also help make the idea of terrorism more objec-
tive, and break down preconceived ideas that exist in the United States that 
only Muslims are terrorists.261 
Police power in the United States is held by the states, not the federal 
government.262 Under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, 
Congress has the power to regulate activity that has a substantial effect on in-
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terstate commerce.263 There must be a requirement in the statute that the act of 
terrorism affects interstate or foreign commerce.264 Establishing an effect on 
commerce should not be a difficult burden to overcome, as attacks intended to 
influence the government and the population have an effect on the entire na-
tion.265 
To differentiate international terrorists from foreign terrorists, there must 
be a requirement that the attack was carried out in the United States by a law-
ful resident of the United States.266 The United States criminal code currently 
provides tools to prosecute individuals directly affiliated with the foreign or-
ganizations.267 This statute would be intended to prosecute only those individ-
uals acting domestically, which the current federal criminal code does not ade-
quately provide for.268 
CONCLUSION 
The United States currently lacks a statute criminalizing domestic terror-
ism. Instead, federal prosecutors use an assortment of statutes under the terror-
ism chapter of the criminal code targeting specific acts or those working with 
foreign groups. This leaves many individuals who fit in the definition of domes-
tic terrorism provided in the Patriot Act to be prosecuted using other statutes. 
The effect has been that a disproportionate number of individuals inspired by 
Islamic extremism are prosecuted as terrorists, while people inspired by other 
ideologies such as white supremacy are not. With the rise in right-wing extremist 
violence, the politicization of who is considered a terrorist, and the similarities in 
how people inspired by Islamic extremism and “domestic” ideologies are radi-
calized, the United States needs to criminalize domestic terrorism and treat all 
who fit the definition the same way. The label of terrorism is impactful, and only 
giving it to people who espouse a certain ideology is wrong. It is important for 
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the United States to adopt a law criminalizing domestic terrorism that treats all 
those who attack the United States and its citizens in the name of a certain ideol-
ogy the same, no matter what ideology they espouse. 
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